This article covers the period of July-November 2024 of the internal developments in Armenia, the foreign dynamics shaping the international relations of Armenia, the ongoing process of signing the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and the bilateral relations of Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalisation of their relations.
As Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan had to retract from or redefine some of his reformist proposals in the face of an extremist and disruptive opposition inside the country, numerically limited but encouraged and abetted by the radical-militant groups in the Diaspora, as well as by the foreign parties siding with the previous administrations and the Church. His vacillating rhetoric on the need for change of the Constitution is one such case in point. The Constitutional Court, in a very expansive decision, confirming that the Declaration of Independence, an inseparable part of the Constitution, is not binding with regard to issues pertaining to Azerbaijan, yet valid for Türkiye. Thus, harboring two conflicting assessments has provided Pashinyan with the ground to change his discourse again. In the process of drafting the peace agreement, Armenia has adamantly insisted, with the backing of foreign, particularly Western countries and circles, on signing a partial agreement which did not take into consideration legitimate concerns or interests of Azerbaijan, thus not befitting the spirit of a lasting peace. The practice of running with the hare and hunting with the hound has continued as Armenia, while extending a hand to Azerbaijan for peace and reconciliation, on the other hand, with the connivance of Western partners, did not shy away from keeping the Karabagh issue alive in international agenda and waged a campaign of accusing Azerbaijan for preparing a military assault. The latest blow to bettering relations was the last minute refusal to be represented in the COP29 conference.
In foreign relations, Armenia’s efforts to manage both Russia and the West, a policy of riding two horses or sitting on two chairs at the same time, has become all the more difficult to sustain. While openly siding with the West on security issues, deep rooted economic reliance on Russia has not changed. As a result of Western tolerance to Armenia in breaking the sanctions imposed on Russia, with collaboration of Iran, a significant leap, albeit temporary, in the GDP has been recorded. Armenia has not opted to stay away from the 3+3 Platform, a regional gathering that promotes the vision that regional issues can best be solved by the cooperation of the countries of the region, in spite of sharing a common understanding with the West that Russian influence in the region should be diminished. Nevertheless, Armenia has rejected the proposal to work out the peace agreement with Azerbaijan within that platform.
The process of normalization of relations between Türkiye and Armenia has kept its positive course. The increase in high level contacts and bilateral communications have demonstrated the mutually softening atmosphere. The developments in Iran and Georgia has made it imperative for Armenia to have the Turkish border open. A railway connection has also acquired priority in addition to the land crossing. Applying all means to press Türkiye to open the border in a dire situation, Armenia nevertheless has continued to totally ignore the need to take counter steps on issues of sensitivity and concern for Türkiye, well known by Armenia, under the guise of “no preconditions”. Furthermore, Armenia’s initiatives to side with countries entrenched in their anti-Türkiye positions or those with conjectural differences have also continued unabated.
Pashinian Mirzoyan Rubinian Diaspora Galstanian Putin Lavrov Zaharova Biden Blinken Erdoğan Fidan
Primary Language | English |
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Subjects | Historical Studies (Other) |
Journal Section | Editorial |
Authors | |
Publication Date | December 9, 2024 |
Submission Date | December 1, 2024 |
Acceptance Date | December 3, 2024 |
Published in Issue | Year 2024 Issue: 50 |