FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI İLE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN İŞLEYİŞİNE DAİR ANTLAŞMA’NIN 102. MADDESİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ

Yıl 2014, Sayı: 60, 3 - 39, 01.12.2014

Günhan Gönül

Öz

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliği’nin İşleyişine Dair Antlaşma’nın 102. maddesinde düzenlenen hâkim durumun kötüye kullanılması halleri ile fikri mülkiyet haklarının kesiştiği durumlar için Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanının geliştirmiş olduğu içtihada ilişkin açıklamalarda bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle, fikri mülkiyet hukuku ile rekabet hukuku arasındaki ilişkinin çatışma mı yoksa bütünsellik mi teşkil ettiği incelenmiştir. Ardından içtihadın iki ana bölümden oluştuğu tespiti yapılmıştır. Buna göre ilk bölüm, çoğu sözleşme yapmayı reddetme biçiminde tezahür eden ve kural olarak fikri mülkiyet haklarına başvurmanın hâkim durumun kötüye kullanılması anlamına gelmeyeceği, ancak istisnai şartlar altında kötüye kullanmanın gerçekleşebileceği klasik fikri mülkiyet-rekabet hukuku çakışmasının yaşandığı davalardan oluşmaktadır. Öte yandan, fikri mülkiyet hak sahiplerinin haklarını kullanmada yeni metotlar geliştirmelerine paralel olarak, Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı içtihatlarının diğer bölümünü yeni kötüye kullanma türleri teşkil etmektedir. İlgili başlık altında, bu kötüye kullanma türleri belirtilmiş ve önemli davalar ile bu davaların geleceğe yönelik olası sonuçları açıklanmıştır. Son olarak, hukuki çarelere ilişkin olarak, ilk bölümdeki davalar için, fikri mülkiyet haklarını göz ardı etmemeye özen göstererek karar verilmesi tavsiye edilmektedir. İkinci bölümde öngörülen hukuki çarelere ilişkin olarak ise, bu kötüye kullanma türleri yeni ticari stratejiler nedeniyle biçim değiştirir nitelikte olduğundan yetkililer aceleci ve tutarsız davranmamaya dikkat etmelidir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hâkim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması, Zorunlu Lisanslama, Sözleşme Yapmayı Reddetme, Fikri Mülkiyet Haklarının Kötüye Kullanımı, AstraZeneca

THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTICLE 102 OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Öz

This article aims to provide an overview of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the intersection of intellectual property rights and the abuse of dominant position under Article 102 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. First, the relationship between intellectual property law and competition law is evaluated whether there is tension or complementarity. Second, the case law is argued to show two segments: The first segment consists of the classic intellectual property-competition law intersection cases where the majority of the cases deal with refusal to license and the principle is that the exercise of intellectual property rights does not constitute abuse of dominance in itself; however, under exceptional circumstances, abuse may be found. On the other hand, the second segment of the case law shows that; in parallel to the intellectual property right holders’ new methods to exploit their intellectual property rights, new types of abusive conduct have arisen. In the relevant section, these abuses are listed and landmark cases and their future implications are provided. Finally, regarding the remedies, for the first segment, they are recommended to be decided cautiously so as not to undermine IPRs. For the second segment, it has been remarked that since these abuse types are mutant due to new commercial strategies, the authorities should not be hasty and inconsistent

Anahtar Kelimeler

Abuse of Dominant Position, Compulsory Licensing, Refusal to License, Misuse of IPRs, AstraZeneca

Kaynakça

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