YESTERDAY MICROSOFT, TODAY GOOGLE: PRODUCT DESIGNS IN HIGH-TECH MARKETS AND CHALLENGES FOR COMPETITION LAW

Yıl 2013, Sayı: 53, 111 - 212, 01.03.2013

Ahmet Fatih Özkan Ayşem Diker Vanberg

Öz

Yüksek teknoloji sektörleri, modern rekabet hukuku ve politikasının doğduğudiğer endüstrilerden belirgin şekilde farklılıklar arz etmektedir. Söz konususektörlerde teşebbüsler genellikle dünya çapında faaliyet göstermekte olup,üretilen ürünler hemen hemen dünyanın her yerinde bulunabilmektedir. Her nekadar pazarlar uluslararası ve ülke sınırlarından bağımsız olsa da, uygulanacakrekabet hukuku kuralları genellikle ulusal ya da bölgesel olmakta, bu nedenle deyüksek teknoloji ürünleri üreten teşebbüsler birbirinden farklı amaçlarizleyebilen farklı hukuk sistemlerine tabi olabilecektir. Artan bir uluslararasıyakınsamanın görüldüğü kartellerle mücadelenin ve yoğunlaşmalarınkontrolünün aksine, tek taraflı davranışların kontrolü noktasında dünyagenelinde belirgin görüş ayrılıkları bulunmaktadır. İşin garip yanı ise yüksekteknoloji sektörlerinde IBM, Microsoft, Google, Intel ve Rambus gibi dünyadevleri aleyhine açılan rekabet davaları veya soruşturmalarının büyükçoğunluğunun, tek taraflı davranış sonucu pazar gücünün kötüye kullanılmasınayönelik iddiaları konu edinmesidir. Tek taraflı davranışlar alanında çözümbekleyen bir husus ise tek taraflı davranışın teşebbüslerin ürünlerini nasıltasarladıklarına yönelik olması halinde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ürün tasarımlarırekabet hukuku altında ele alınabilecek en tartışmalı tek taraflı davranış olaraköne çıkmaktadır. Ürün tasarımlarını rekabete aykırı olarak değerlendirmehususunda rekabet otoriteleri veya mahkemeleri mevcut tüketici zararının varlığıhususunu gözden kaçırmamalıdırlar

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tek Taraflı Davranışlar, Hâkim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması, Ürün Tasarımları, Yüksek Teknoloji Sektörleri, Yeni Ekonomi

YESTERDAY MICROSOFT, TODAY GOOGLE: PRODUCT DESIGNS IN HIGH-TECH MARKETS AND CHALLENGES FOR COMPETITION LAW

Öz

High-tech markets differ markedly from most of the industries in which moderncompetition law and policy emerged. In these markets, firms often operateglobally and their products can virtually be found all over the world. Althoughthe markets may be global and free from national borders, applicable competitionlaws are mostly national or regional, meaning that high-tech firms might besubject to different jurisdictions pursuing potentially different objectives. Incontrast to the prohibition of cartels and merger control, where there is agrowing global convergence, there is substantial divergence on the appropriatescope of control that should be placed upon unilateral conduct. Ironically, mostcompetition cases or investigations in high-tech markets involving global hightech giants, such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, Intel and Rambus, deal withunilateral conduct and allegations of abuse of market power. In the area ofunilateral conduct, a more pressing concern arises when the conduct in questionrelates to how dominant high-tech firms design their products. Product designsappear to be the most controversial type of unilateral conduct to be challengedunder competition law. Competition authorities and courts should not lose sightof the presence of actual consumer harm when ruling product designs as anticompetitive

Anahtar Kelimeler

Unilateral Conduct, Abuse of Dominance, Product Designs, HighTech Markets, New Economy

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• Decisions and Judgments (in alphabetical order) US District Court
• Caldera, Inc. v Microsoft Corp., 72 F.Supp. 2d 1295 (D.Utah 1999)
• ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v IBM Corp., 448 F.Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal 1978)
• Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v IBM Corp., 585 F.Supp. 1470 (D.N.J. 1984)
• New York v Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002)
• Telex Corp. v IBM Corp., 367 F.Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973)
• United States v Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
• United States v Microsoft Corp., 980 F.Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997) US Court of Appeals
• California Computer Products Inc. v IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979)
• Memorex Corp. v IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980)
• Rambus Inc. v FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir 2008)
• Telex Corp. v IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975)
• Transamerica Computer Co. v IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983)
• United States v Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
• United States v Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir 1998)
• United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) US Supreme Court
• Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)
• Jefferson Parish Hospital Distict No 2 v Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
• Standard Oil Co v United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) European Commission
• Case IV/30.787 Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti [1988] OJ L 65/19
• Case IV/30.849 IBM Personal Computers [1984] OJ L 118/24
• Case COMP/C-3 /37.990 — Intel [2009] OJ C 227/13
• Case COMP/M.5984 — Intel/McAfee [2011] OJ C 98/1
• Case COMP/C-3/37.792 —Microsoft [2004] OJ L 32/23
• Case COMP/39.530 — Microsoft (Tying) [2009] (unpublished)
• Case COMP/M.5727 —Microsoft/Yahoo Search Business [2010] OJ C 20/32
• Case COMP/38.636 — Rambus [2010] OJ C 30/17
• Case IV/31.043 Tetra Pak II [1992] OJ L 72/1 General Court
• Case T-340/03 France Telecom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-207
• Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163
• Case T-203/01 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission [2003] ECR II-4071
• Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601
• Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II v Commission [1994] ECR II-755
• Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653
• Court of Justice of the European Union
• Case C-53/92P Hilti AG v Commission [1994] ECR I-666
• Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461
• Case C-497/99 Irish Sugar plc v Commission [2001] ECR I-5333
• Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461
• Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951
• Case 27/76 United Brands Co. v Commission [1978] ECR 207
• Press Releases (in chronological order)
• Press Release, “Commission Concludes on Microsoft Investigation, Imposes Conduct Remedies and a Fine”, IP/04/382, 24 March 2004
• Press Release, “Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas O. Barnett, Issues Statement on European Microsoft Decision”, 07-725, Washington 17 September 2007
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections
• to Microsoft on the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows”, MEMO/09/15, 17 January 2009
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission statement on Microsoft Internet Explorer
• announcement”, MEMO/09/272, 12 June 2009
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission welcomes Microsoft’s roll-out of web
• browser choice”, IP/10/216, 2 March 2010
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by
• Google”, IP/10/1624, 30 November 2010
• Press Release, “Mergers: Commission clears Intel’s proposed acquisition of McAfee
• subject to conditions”, IP/11/70, 26 January 2011
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Microsoft to
• investigate possible non-compliance with browser choice commitments”, IP/12/800, 17 July 2012
• Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Microsoft
• on non-compliance with browser choice commitments”, IP/12/1149, 24 October 2012