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هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟

Year 2022, Volume: 11 Issue: 2, 109 - 150, 01.04.2022

Kemal İnat , Melih Yıldırım

Abstract

يناقش هذا البحث الصعود الصيني في ضوء البيانات الاقتصادية والعسكرية، ويحلّل دلالة التحدي الذي تشكله الصين للقيادة العالمية للولايات المتحدة، كما يفحص البحث التغيرات التي طرأت على مؤشرات القوة العسكرية والاقتصادية لكل من الولايات المتحدة والصين خلال العقود الثلاثة المنصرمة، ويبحث عن إجابة للسؤال الآتي: "ماذا ستكون تداعيات الصعود الصيني على النظام الدولي؟، للإجابة عن هذا السؤال ستجري مناقشة سوابق "الصعود والتحدي" المشابهة لوضع التحدي الذي تمثله الصين في سياقه وتحليله. يشير البحث إلى أن الصين إذ تسعى إلى تحسين مكانتها العالمية تأخذ في اعتبارها حالات التحدي التي أخفقت فيما مضى. فالصين التي لا ترغب في تكرار الأخطاء التي ارتكبتها ألمانيا والاتحاد السوفييتي مترددة في اتّباع سياسة عسكرية عدوانية، وتسعى إلى تضييق نطاق تنافسها مع الولايات المتحدة، وحصره في المجال الاقتصادي. وقد نجحت سياسة الصين لتجنب الصراع المباشر، والتركيز على التنمية الاقتصادية في جعلها أكبر منافس اقتصادي للولايات المتحدة، في حين فتح الصعود الصيني الباب أمام نقاشات حول نهاية النظام الدولي الذي تقوده الولايات المتحدة والغرب.

Keywords

الصين الولايات المتحدة الصعود الصيني تحدي القيادة الأمريكية النظام الدولي

References

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  • Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (UK: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 209.
  • George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Sea Power in Global Politics 1494–1993, (London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 70–82.
  • Ivan T. Berend, An Economic History of Nineteenth Century Europe: Diversity and Industrialization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 192.
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Will the Rise of China Transform the International System?

Year 2022, Volume: 11 Issue: 2, 109 - 150, 01.04.2022

Kemal İnat , Melih Yıldırım

Abstract

In this article, the rise of China is discussed in the light of economic and military data, and what the challenge from China means for the global leadership of the United States is analyzed. Changes in the indicators of the U.S. and China’s economic and military power over the last 30–40 years are examined and an answer is sought for the following question: What will the consequences of China’s rise be in terms of the international political system? To answer this question, similar ‘rise and challenge’ precedents are discussed to contextualize and analyze and the present challenge China poses. This article concludes that while improving its global status, China has been taking the previous cases’ failed challenges into consideration. China, which does not want to repeat the mistakes made by Germany and the Soviet Union, is hesitant to pursue an aggressive military policy and tries to limit its rivalry with the U.S. in the economic area. While Chinese policy of avoiding direct conflict and focusing on economic development has made it the biggest economic rival of the U.S, the rise of China initiates the discussions about the end of the U.S. and West-led international system.

Keywords

China U.S. Rise of China Challenge to American Leadership International System

References

  • Goedele De Keersmaeker, Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 90.
  • النسب الموجودة بين قوسين تمثل حصة الإمبراطورية البريطانية مجتمعة من الدخل العالمي، فيما تمثل النسب الأخرى حصة بريطانيا وحدها.
  • Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Volume 1) and Historical Statistics (Volume 2), (OECD Publishing, 2006), p. 641; Keersmaeker, Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory, p. 90.
  • W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1978), p. 67.
  • Maddison, The World Economy, p. 97.
  • John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System 1830–1970, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 116.
  • Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (UK: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 209.
  • George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Sea Power in Global Politics 1494–1993, (London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 70–82.
  • Ivan T. Berend, An Economic History of Nineteenth Century Europe: Diversity and Industrialization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 192.
  • Werner Abelshauser, “Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftswunder,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1999), p. 504.
  • Walter Hoffman, “Kapitel: Die Produktion von Industrie und Handwerk,” in Walther G. Hoffmann (ed.), Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19 Jahrhunderts, (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 1965), pp. 344–395; https://histat.gesis.org/histat/de/table/details/0B62D8EC771D20313A03F1C335A55C2A#tabelle
  • Abelshauser, “Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftswunder,” p. 506.
  • Michael Wildt, “Der Weg in den Krieg,” Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, No. 316 (2012).
  • Jörg Lichter, “Kanonen Statt Butter,” Handelsblatt, (June 25, 2007), retrieved from https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/konjunktur/oekonomie/nachrichten/wirtschaftshistoriker-bewerten-hitlers-wirtschaftspolitik-neu-kanonen-statt-butter/2826738.html.
  • “Deutsche Staatsausgaben und Volkseinkommen 1928–1938,” GESIS - Leibnitz Institut für Sozialwissensachaften, retrieved September 27, 2021, from https://histat.gesis.org/histat/de/table/details/8CB941157DF2DF420184AF7AA353E1B2.
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  • Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 25.
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  • Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, p. 244.
  • Christopher Davis, “Country Survey XVI the Defense Sector in the Economy of a Declining Superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965–2001,” Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2002), p. 153.
  • Brian Benjamin Crisher and Mark Souva, “Power at Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865–2011,” International Interactions, Vol. 40, No. 4 (May 2014), p. 626.
  • David M. Walsh, The Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976–1985, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 132.
  • While the U.S. naval power largely focused on developing the power projection capacity with its large number of aircraft carriers, the USSR naval power largely tried to increase its submarine capacity; Crisher and Souva, “Power at Sea,” p. 622.
  • A Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), p. 60. George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 11.
  • Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, p. 11.
  • Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 3, 10.
  • “Vergleich der Verteidigungsausgaben der USA und der USSR in den Jahren von 1950 bis 1990,” Statista, retrieved from https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/935886/umfrage/verteidigungsausgaben-der-usa-und-der-udssr/.
  • “GDP Growth (Annual Percent) – China, United States,” The World Bank, retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=CN-US&start=1974.
  • “GDP (current US$) – China”, The World Bank, retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN; “GDP, PPP (Current International $) – China” The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=CN; “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021,” BP, (2021), retrieved from https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
  • “GDP (current US$) – China, United States”, The World Bank, retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN-US; “GDP, PPP (Current International $) – China United States” The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=CN-US; “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021,” BP, (2021), retrieved from https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
  • “GDP, PPP (Current International $) – China, United States,” The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?end=2020&locations=CN-US&start=2010.
  • “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021,” BP, (2021), retrieved from https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
  • Enerdata, https://yearbook.enerdata.net/total-energy/world-import-export-statistics.html
  • “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021.”
  • “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021.”
  • Paul Heney, “2021 Global R&D Funding Forecast Released,” R&D World, (February 22, 2021), retrieved from https://www.rdworldonline.com/2021-global-rd-funding-forecast-released/. “Fortune 500,” Fortune, (January 30, 2021), retrieved from https://fortune.com/fortune500/.
  • “General Government Debt,” OECD, (October 1, 2021), retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm#indicator-chart.
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  • M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s “World-Class Military,” Ambitions: Origins and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 19, 2020), p. 85.
  • Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, and Alexandra Marksteiner, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020,” SIPRI, (April 2021), p. 2; “Military Expenditure (Current USD),” The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD; “Military Expenditure (Current USD) – United States, China,” The World Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=US-CN.
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  • Abraham Ait, “What’s Next for China’s Fifth Generation Fighter Jet?” The Diplomat, (February 9, 2019).
  • “Is China at the Forefront of Drone Technology?” CSIS, retrieved October 4, 2021, from https://chinapower.csis.org/china-drones-unmanned-technology/.
  • “China’s Most Advanced Stealth Drones Make Air Show Debut,” Global Times, (September 28, 2021), retrieved October 4, 2021, from https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1235398.shtml.
  • “The Military Balance, 2021”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, February 2021), pp. 28, 29; “The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics 2015”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 24, 25; “The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics 2005-2006”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 25-29, 274.
  • Sukjoon Yoon, “Implications of Xi Jinping’s ‘True Maritime Power’: Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the Region,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Summer 2015), p. 42.
  • In 2020, the Chinese navy had 350 ships, while the U.S. navy had 293; John Grady, “Pentagon Report: China Now Has World’s Largest Navy as Beijing Expands Military Influence,” USNI, (September 1, 2020), retrieved August 26, 2021, from https://news.usni.org/2020/09/01/pentagon-report-china-now-has-worlds-largest-navy-as-beijing-expands-military-influence.
  • “The Military Balance, 2021” p. 27.
  • Type-055 destroyers are the most advanced warships of the Chinese navy, equipped with 112 vertical launch system cells. They were first put into service in 2020, The Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, have 96 vertical launch system cells.
  • Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS, (August 3, 2021), retrieved from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, p. 10
  • “Missiles of China,” CSIS, (April 12, 2021), retrieved from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
  • Matthew P. Funaiole, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Brian Hart, “A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines,” CSIS, (August 4, 2021), retrieved October 4, 2021, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines.
  • “How is China Advancing its Space Launch Capabilities?” CSIS, retrieved October 5, 2021,from https://chinapower.csis.org/china-space-launch/.
  • “How is China Advancing its Space Launch Capabilities?”
  • “The Military Balance, 2021” pp. 41, 238; “The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics 2015,” pp. 48, 250.
  • “GDP (Current US$) – Japan, China, United States, European Union,” The World Bank, retrieved October 9, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=JP-CN-US-EU&start=1980.
  • “GDP Growth (Annual Percent) – China, United States.”
  • “Military expenditure (current USD) – China, United States, Russian Federation, European Union”, The World Bank, retrieved October 9, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=CN-US-RU-EU.
There are 61 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Arabic
Subjects Globalisation
Journal Section Research Articles
Authors

Kemal İnat 0000-0001-5292-3331

Melih Yıldırım 0000-0001-8226-6299

Publication Date April 1, 2022
Published in Issue Year 2022 Volume: 11 Issue: 2

Cite

APA İnat, K., & Yıldırım, M. (2022). هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟. Rouya Türkiyyah, 11(2), 109-150.
AMA İnat K, Yıldırım M. هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟. Rouya Türkiyyah. April 2022;11(2):109-150.
Chicago İnat, Kemal, and Melih Yıldırım. “هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟”. Rouya Türkiyyah 11, no. 2 (April 2022): 109-50.
EndNote İnat K, Yıldırım M (April 1, 2022) هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟. Rouya Türkiyyah 11 2 109–150.
IEEE K. İnat and M. Yıldırım, “هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟”, Rouya Türkiyyah, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 109–150, 2022.
ISNAD İnat, Kemal - Yıldırım, Melih. “هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟”. Rouya Türkiyyah 11/2 (April 2022), 109-150.
JAMA İnat K, Yıldırım M. هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟. Rouya Türkiyyah. 2022;11:109–150.
MLA İnat, Kemal and Melih Yıldırım. “هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟”. Rouya Türkiyyah, vol. 11, no. 2, 2022, pp. 109-50.
Vancouver İnat K, Yıldırım M. هل سيحول الصعود الصيني النظام الدولي؟. Rouya Türkiyyah. 2022;11(2):109-50.