INVESTIGATING LINEAR MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION: A REVIEW STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION SAFETY CONTEXT

Year 2020, Volume: 38 Issue: 4, 1939 - 1949, 05.10.2021

Sevilay Demirkesen

Abstract

A major challenge of today is to prevent accidents from occurring in the construction industry. Hence, the causes of accidents need to be defined at the first step. Due to the emerging need for determining causes of accidents, several accident causation theories and models are developed. However, traditional accident modeling approaches are insufficient to analyze accidents occurring in complex environments. Accidents do not only occur due to human factors but also occur due to mechanical and environmental factors. Hence, a more systemic approach is crucial in accident modeling research. This paper reviews key traditional accident causation theories and models and lists their strengths and limitations. The main contribution of this paper is to reveal the lacking points of existing accident causation approaches, emphasize the need for more essential causation models, and encourage safety practitioners to develop more efficient accident prevention strategies. In this respect, the paper presents linear accident causation models, which are traditional theories of accident causation focusing on linear sequence of events. The paper is expected to guide health and safety practitioners to find the real causes of accidents by means of a systematic analysis and understand the process for accident analysis and prevention.

Keywords

Accident causation models, safety, safety management, construction.

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