AiLE ŞiRKETLERi VE İNOVASYON: YÖNETiM YAPISININ AR-GE YATIRIMLARI VE İNOVASYON SONUÇLARI ÜZERİNDEKİ ROLÜNÜN İNCELENMESİ

Year 2025, , 8 - 23, 30.01.2025

Sena Özkara , Nurgül Keleş Tayşir

https://doi.org/10.55830/tje.1589352

Abstract

Bu çalışma, yönetim yapısının -özellikle, sadece aile yönetimi, karma yönetim (hem aile üyelerini hem de dış yöneticileri içeren) ve dış yönetim- ile yönetilen aile şirketlerindeki inovasyon girdileri ve çıktıları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Mannheim İnovasyon Panelinden (MIP) elde edilen dört yıllık panel verilerini kullanan araştırma, yönetim yapılarının toplam inovasyon harcamaları ve Ar-Ge harcamaları gibi inovasyon girdilerinin yanı sıra yeni veya geliştirilmiş ürünlerden elde edilen ciro ve pazardaki yenilikler de dahil olmak üzere inovasyon çıktılarını nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktadır. Önceki çalışmalar (Decker & Günther, 2017) aile şirketlerinde yönetim ve inovasyon arasındaki ilişkiyi araştırmış olsa da bu çalışma bu ilişkilerin gelişimini anlamak için panel verilerini inceleyerek bu çalışmayı genişletmektedir. Bu çalışma, hem Sosyo-Duygusal Zenginlik (SEW) teorisini hem de Vekalet Teorisini entegre ederek, aile şirketlerindeki farklı yönetim yapılarının zaman içinde inovasyonu nasıl etkilediğine dair kapsamlı bir bakış açısı sunmakta, birden fazla sektördeki inovasyon girdisi ve çıktısı hakkında içgörüler sunmakta ve aile dinamiklerinin ve kontrolünün bu sonuçları şekillendirmedeki rolünü vurgulamaktadır.

Keywords

Aile İşletmeleri, İnovasyon, Yönetim Yapısı, Panel Veri, Sosyo-duygusal Zenginlik (SEW)

Project Number

1

FAMILY FIRMS AND INNOVATION: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ON R&D INVESTMENT AND OUTCOMES

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of managerial structure—specifically, only-family-managed, mixed-managed (involving family members and external managers), and external-managed—on innovation inputs and outputs in family firms. Based on four years of panel data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and investigates how managerial structures influence innovation inputs, covering total innovation expenditure and R&D expenditure, as well as innovation outputs like revenue from new or improved products and market novelties. Decker and Günther (2017) have conducted research on the relationship between management and innovation in family firms. However, this study extends this work by integrating both Socio-Emotional Wealth (SEW) theory and Agency Theory. Moreover, it provides a comprehensive view of how different governance structures in family firms affect innovation in time.It provides insights into innovation inputs and outputs across multiple sectors, highlighting the role of family dynamics and control in driving these outcomes. Finally, the study contributes to the existing literature by providing both theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between governance structures and innovation performance, emphasizing the unique characteristics of family firms.

Keywords

Family Firms, Innovation, Management Structure, Panel Data, Socio-emotional Wealth (SEW)

Project Number

1

References

• Abernathy, W. J., & Clark, K. B. (1985). Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative destruction. Research policy, 14(1), 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(85)90021-6
• Ahrens, J. P., Uhlaner, L., Woywode, M., & Zybura, J. (2018). “Shadow emperor” or “loyal paladin”?–The Janus face of previous owner involvement in family firm successions. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 9(1), 73-90.
• Astrachan, J. H., & Shanker, M. C. (2003). Family businesses’ contribution to the US economy: A closer look. Family business review, 16(3), 211-219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2017.11.003
• Block, J. H. (2012). R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective. Journal of business venturing, 27(2), 248-265. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2010.09.003
• Block, J., Hansen, C., & Steinmetz, H. (2023). Are family firms doing more innovation output with less innovation input? A replication and extension. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 47(4), 1496-1520. https://doi.org/10.1177/10422587221084249
• Chandler, A.D., 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
• Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. A. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non–family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and practice, 28(4), 335-354. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00049.x
• Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W., & Barnett, T. (2012). Family involvement, family influence, and family–centered non–economic goals in small firms. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 36(2), 267-293. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00407.x
• Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., De Massis, A., Frattini, F., & Wright, M. (2015). The ability and willingness paradox in family firm innovation. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 32(3), 310-318. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpim.12207
• Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Sharma, P. (1999). Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 23(4), 19-39. https://doi.org/10.1177/104225879902300402
• Classen, N., Carree, M., Van Gils, A., & Peters, B. (2014). Innovation in family and non-family SMEs: An exploratory analysis. Small Business Economics, 42, 595-609. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-013-9490-z
• De Massis, A., Di Minin, A., & Frattini, F. (2015). Family-driven innovation: Resolving the paradox in family firms. California Management Review, 58(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2015.58.1.5
• Decker, C., & Günther, C. (2017). The impact of family ownership on innovation: Evidence from the German machine tool industry. Small Business Economics, 48, 199-212.
• Duran, P., Kammerlander, N., Van Essen, M., & Zellweger, T. (2016). Doing more with less: Innovation input and output in family firms. Academy of management Journal, 59(4), 1224-1264. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.0424
• Dyer, W. G. (1994). Potential contributions of organizational behavior to the study of family-owned businesses. Family Business Review, 7(2), 109-131. https://doi.org/10.1177/104225879401900105
• Dyer, W. G. (2006). Examining the “Family Effect” on Firm Performance. Family Business Review, 19(4), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00074.x
• Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2007). Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective. Journal of business venturing, 22(4), 545-565. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2006.06.004
• Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M., Gutierrez, I., (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal 44 (1), 81–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069338
• Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative science quarterly, 52(1), 106-137. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.52.1.106
• Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010). Diversification decisions in family‐controlled firms. Journal of management studies, 47(2), 223-252. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00889.x
• Górriz, C. G., & Fumás, V. S. (1996). Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain. Managerial and decision economics, 17(6), 575-586.
• Handler, W. C. (1989). Methodological issues and considerations in studying family businesses. Family business review, 2(3), 257-276. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1989.00257.x
• Meckling, W. H., & Jensen, M. C. (1976). Theory of the Firm. Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
• La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.0011
• Lyman, A. R. (1991). Customer service: does family ownership make a difference?. Family business review, 4(3), 303-324. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.1991.00303.x
• March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization science, 2(1), 71-87. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.71
• McKinsey & Company. (2023). The secrets of outperforming family-owned businesses: How they create value—and how you can become one.
• Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Management insights from great and struggling family businesses. Long Range Planning, 38(6), 517-530. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2005.09.001
• Miller, E. J., & Rice, A. K. (1967). Systems of organization: The control of task and sentient boundaries. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315013947
• Miller, D., Wright, M., Breton-Miller, I. L., & Scholes, L. (2015). Resources and innovation in family businesses: The Janus-face of socioemotional preferences. California Management Review, 58(1), 20-40. https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2015.58.1.20
• Miller, D. (1991). Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment. Management science, 37(1), 34-52. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.1.34
• Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 27(4), 367-382. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-8520.t01-1-00015
• Morck, R., & Yeung, B. Y. (2004). Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control. Available at SSRN 625283.
• OECD. (2005). Oslo Manual: Guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data (3rd ed.). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/19900414
• Riefolo, M., Özkara, S., Ahrens, J. P., & Nekouei, N. (2024). Should former leaders stay involved in the family firm? Familybusiness.org Retrieved November 2, 2024, https://familybusiness.org/content/should-former-leaders-stay-involved-in-the-family-firm https://doi.org/10.32617/1076-66b212ad353d1
• Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. The American economic review, 63(2), 134-139.
• Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization science, 12(2), 99-116. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114
• Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003a). Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms. Academy of management journal, 46(2), 179-194. https://doi.org/10.5465/30040613
• Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003b). Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms. Journal of business venturing, 18(4), 473-490. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026(03)00054-5
• Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 27(4), 339-358. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-8520.t01-1-00013
• Ward, John L. 1987. Keeping the family business healthy: how to plan for continuing growth. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
• Zahra, S. A., Neubaum, D. O., & Larrañeta, B. (2007). Knowledge sharing and technological capabilities: The moderating role of family involvement. Journal of Business research, 60(10), 1070-1079. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.014
• Zahra, S. A. (2012). Organizational learning and entrepreneurship in family firms: Exploring the moderating effect of ownership and cohesion. Small business economics, 38, 51-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-010-9266-7
• Zahra, S. A., Hayton, J. C., & Salvato, C. (2004). Entrepreneurship in family vs. non–family firms: A resource–based analysis of the effect of organizational culture. Entrepreneurship theory and Practice, 28(4), 363-381. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00051.x
• ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. (n.d.). Mannheim Innovation Panel: Innovation activities of enterprises in Germany. Retrieved November 2, 2024, from https://www.zew.de/en/research-at-zew/projects/mannheim-innovation-panel-innovation-activities-of-enterprises-in-germany