A brief review on attack design and detection strategies for networked cyber-physical systems

Year 2021, Volume: 5 Issue: 1, 1 - 7, 01.01.2021

Mustafa Şinasi Ayas

https://doi.org/10.31127/tuje.640282

Cited By: 2

Abstract

Networked cyber-physical systems (NCPSs) can be found in various fields such as industrial process, robotics, smart buildings, energy, healthcare systems, transportation, and surveillance. Recently accomplished real-time attacks indicate security vulnerabilities that weaken the reliability of NCPSs. Research areas on the security of NCPSs can be categorized into two groups: from the perspective of information security, from the perspective of control theory. In this paper, first possible attack locations on the control scheme of a NCPS which can be divided into three different groups namely sensor side, actuator side, and state estimator side are discussed and then a brief survey containing some recent studies on security strategies for NCPSs from the perspective of control theory is presented. After that attack detection strategies for a NCPS are briefly introduced and a general architecture utilized for attack detection on a NCPS is presented. In addition, some of recent studies on attack detection strategies for NCPSs from the perspective of control theory are discussed.

Keywords

Networked Cyber-Physical System, Cyber-security, Attack Design, Attack Detection, Control-theoretic, CPS

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