An Unforced Error: The Untold Story of the Suleymaniyah Hood Incident

Abstract

One of the most significant events damaging Turkish – American relations in the 21st century was the “Sulaymaniyah Hood Incident” of July 4, 2003, which is widely recalled in Turkey today as the “Hood Incident” (Çuval Olayı). However, what happened that day is conspicuously absent from American histories of the war. According to a contemporary apologia from then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the decision to apprehend the Turkish soldiers was made suddenly “in view of time-sensitive and credible intelligence.” In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth, and the full story of the incident has never been revealed. What actually happened that day was a deliberate “sting operation” organized by Jelal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), designed to embarrass the Turks and weaken their influence in northern Iraq. Colonel William C. Mayville Jr, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade supported and participated in the plan and Major General Raymond T. Odierno, commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division, approved American participation. This is a first person account of the decisions that led to an avoidable confrontation that escalated out of control which continues to afflict the Turkish-American strategic partnership today.

Keywords

• Sulaymaniyah Hood Incident
• Operation Iraqi Freedom
• Turkish – American Relations
• Raymond T. Odierno

Zorunlu Olmayan Bir Hata: Süleymaniye Çuval Hadisesinin Anlatılmamış Hikâyesi

Abstract

Yirmi birinci yüzyılda Türk – Amerikan ilişkilerine en çok zarar veren olaylardan biri, 4 Temmuz 2003 tarihinde gerçekleşen ve Türkiye’de “Çuval Olayı” olarak hafızalara kazınan “Süleymaniye Çuval Hadisesi”dir. Ancak, o gün yaşananlar Amerikan savaş tarihlerinde neredeyse hiç yer bulmamaktadır. Dönemin Savunma Bakanı Donald Rumsfeld tarafından yapılan bir savunmaya göre, Türk askerlerinin gözaltına alınması kararı, “zamanla sınırlı ve güvenilir istihbarat” doğrultusunda ani bir şekilde verilmiştir. Oysa gerçekte durum bundan çok uzaktır ve olayın tam hikâyesi hiçbir zaman açıklığa kavuşmamıştır. Gerçekte o gün yaşananlar, Kürdistan Yurtseverler Birliği (KYB) lideri Celal Talabani tarafından Türkleri küçük düşürmek ve kuzey Irak’taki etkilerini zayıflatmak amacıyla kurgulanmış kasıtlı bir “komplo operasyonuydu.” 173. Hava Tümeni'nin komutanı Albay William C. Mayville Jr., bu plana destek vermiş ve doğrudan katılmış; 4. Piyade Tümeni Komutanı Tümgeneral Raymond T. Odierno ise Amerikan katılımını onaylamıştır. Bu makale, kaçınılmaz olmayan bir çatışmaya yol açan kararları birinci elden aktaran ve bugün hâlâ Türk-Amerikan stratejik ortaklığını etkileyen bir krizin perde arkasını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Keywords

• Süleymaniye Çuval Hadisesi
• Irak
• Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri
• Raymond T. Odierno

References

1. Aydogdu, Ali Uygar. The Sack Incident: A Crisis in Turkish-American Relations and Its Strategic Consequences. The Center for Intelligence and Security Research (IGAM), Ankara, December 9, 2024.
2. Babcock, Robert O. Operation Iraqi Freedom I: A Year in the Sunni Triangle, The History of the 4th Infantry Division and Task Force Ironhorse in Iraq, April 2003 to April 2004. Tuscaloosa, AL: St. John’s Press, 2005.
3. Baker III, James A., Lee H. Hamilton, et al. The Iraq Study Group Report. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
4. Barkey, Henri J. Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2005.
5. Benson, Kevin C.M. Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraqi War. Havertown, PA: Casement Publishers, 2024.
6. Criss, Nur Bilgi. “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case.” The Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 472–484.
7. Connors, Peter W. The US Army in Kirkuk: Governance Operations along the Fault Lines of Iraqi Society, 2003–2009. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2011.
8. Erickson, Edward J. “Turkey as Regional Hegemon—2014: Strategic Implications for the United States.” Turkish Studies 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 25–45.

9. Fontenot, Gregory, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn. On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2004.
10. Gibson, Bryan R. “The Secret Origins of the U.S.-Kurdish Relationship Explain Today’s Disaster.” The Kurdish Institute of Paris, October 14, 2019.
11. McGrath, John J., ed. Between the Rivers: Combat Action in Iraq, 2003–2005. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 2013.
12. Mulroy, Mick, and Kenneth Tovo. “Irregular Warfare: A Case Study in CIA and US Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002–03.” Middle East Institute, August 12, 2021.
13. Poushter, Jacob. “The Turkish People Don’t Look Favorably Upon the U.S., or Any Other Country, Really.” The Pew Research Centre, October 31, 2014.
14. Rayburn, Joel D., and Frank K. Sobchak. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003–2006. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019.
15. Rudd, Gordon W. Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006.
16. Tunnell IV, Harry D. Red Devils: Tactical Perspectives from Iraq. Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, n.d.
17. Yetkin, Murat. “Sack Action against US Soldiers in Izmir: Is It Anti-Imperialism or What?” The Yetkin Report, September 3, 2024. https://yetkinreport.com/2024/09/03/izmirde-abd-askerine-cuval-eylemi-anti-emperyalizm-mi-degilse-ne/.