Uluslararası Yatırım Antlaşmalarının İhlalinde Demokratik Yönetişim ve Dolaylı Kamulaştırmanın Rolü

Year 2021, Volume: 18 Issue: 72, 37 - 49, 20.12.2021

David Carlson Jeffrey Zıegler

https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1011808

Abstract

Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri
varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık
ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik
kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları,
yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin,
hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye
teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım
gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar
geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor.

Keywords

Yatırım Anlaşmaları, Siyasi Hesap Verebilirlik, Dolaylı Kamulaştırma, Politik Ekonomi

The Role of Democratic Governance and Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Treaty Violations

Abstract

Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may
intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political
constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic
public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side
with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the
ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation
that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation.

Keywords

Investment Treaties, Electoral Accountability, Indirect Expropriation, Political Economy

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