Political Economy of Property Rights: Sample Country Cases

Abstract

Property rights are the main component of liberal economic system. Therefore, free market economies support institutional mechanism and political economic performance of the countries. More specifically, property rights protection and income inequality are the key legal and economic factors for economic growth. However, literature is lack in order to explain the relationship between property rights protection and income inequality in a theoretical and statistical way. This paper aims to fill these gaps with political economic perspective and through simple country analysis. It is important to show this relationship in order to show up the substitutability of legal protection of property rights with the political economic perspective in the event of income inequality. Especially developing countries are under the impact of efficient or inefficient institutions and political economic problems. In order to verify our hypothesis, this study try to reveal whether or not property rights protection and income inequality have a negative relationship simply. It is chosen Russia and Turkey as sample states and simple ordinary correlation analysis has done. The empirical results show the negative correlation between income inequality and legal protection of property rights under relevant conditions. Empirical results are consistent with the theoretical background and literature review part of this study.

Keywords

• political economy
• property rights
• income inequality
• Russia
• Turkey

Political Economy of Property Rights: Sample Country Cases

Abstract

Mülkiyet hakları, liberal ekonomik sistemin ana ve içkin öğesidir. Bu nedenle serbest piyasa ekonomileri, ülkelerin kurumsal mekanizmalarını ve politik ekonomik performanslarını desteklemektedir. Daha spesifik olarak, mülkiyet haklarının korunması ve gelir eşitsizliği, ekonomik büyüme için kilit yasal ve ekonomik faktörlerdir. Ancak literatür mülkiyet haklarının korunması ile gelir eşitsizliği arasındaki ilişkiyi teorik ve istatistiksel olarak açıklamak için yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu makale, söz konusu boşlukları politik ekonomik bakış açısıyla ve basit bir ülke analizi aracılığı ile gidermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Gelir eşitsizliği durumunda mülkiyet haklarının yasal korunmasının politik ekonomik bakış açısı ile ikame edilebilirliğini ortaya koymak için bu ilişkiyi göstermek önemlidir. Özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkeler etkin veya etkin olmayan kurumların ve politik ekonomik sorunların etkisi altındadır. Bu çalışma, hipotezimizi test etmek amacıyla, mülkiyet haklarının korunması ile gelir dağılımı arasında negatif bir ilişkisi olup olmadığını basitçe ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Örnek devletler olarak Rusya ve Türkiye seçilmiş ve basit sıradan korelasyon analizi yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar, gelir eşitsizliği ile ilgili koşullar altında mülkiyet haklarının yasal olarak korunması arasında negatif bir ilişki olduğunu göstermektedir. Ampirik sonuçların, bu çalışmanın teorik arka planı ve literatür taraması ile uyumlu olduğu görülmektedir.

Keywords

• Political Economy
• Property Rights
• Income inequality
• Russia
• Turkey

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