Teknolojik Soğuk Savaş: Kapıdaki Çin

Year 2025, Volume: 5 Issue: 2, 223 - 235, 29.10.2025

Burcu Türkcan , Mustafa Mutluer

https://doi.org/10.70101/ussmad.1660326

Abstract

1970’lerden bu yana ulus devletler arasındaki güç dengeleri yarı iletkenler üretimi nedeniyle değişim göstermiştir. Mikroçip üretimi, daha yüksek büyüme, ticaret ve rekabet gücü oranları sağlayarak Çin'e kaymıştır. Bu nedenle ABD, Çin ile ticaret ve Çin’e yatırım konularında zorunlu politikalar uygulamaya başlamıştır. Ancak yarı iletken endüstrisinde Çin üretiminin yükselişi hala çok büyüktür. Güncel tartışmalar, mevcut rekabetin İkinci Soğuk Savaş olarak adlandırılabileceğini işaret etmektedir. Ancak Çin'in sosyoekonomik yapısı SSCB'ye benzemediğinden bu tanım tam olarak doğru değildir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, kritik teknolojiler üzerinde üstünlük sağlamaya çalışan süper güçler arasındaki jeopolitik rekabet olarak tanımlanan Teknolojik Soğuk Savaş ifadesini benimsemektedir. Üstelik tüm bu tartışmalar, küresel güç dengelerindeki eğilimleri anlamak için mevcut durumun acilen analiz edilmesi gerektiğini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın temel amacı iki yönlüdür. Birincisi, mikroçip üretimi ve ticareti açısından her iki ülkenin mevcut durumunun analiz edilmesidir. İkincisi ise yeni küresel çağın güç dengelerinin öngörülebilmesidir. Bu konuya ilişkin ekonomi politikası analizlerinde eksiklik olması nedeniyle ilgili literatüre katkı yapılması hedeflenmektedir.

Keywords

Yarı iletken endüstrisi , mikroçipler , iktisat politikası , Çin

Tech Cold War: China at the Gate

Abstract

Power balances across nation-states have changed because of the semiconductor production since 1970s. Manufacture of microchips have shifted through China, by providing higher growth, trade and competitiveness rates. Hence, the United States has begun to apply compulsory policies on trading with and investing in China. However, the rise of Chinese production in the semiconductor industry is still tremendous. Emerging discussions suggest that the current rivalry can be called as the Second Cold War. However, this definition is not completely true, since China’s socio-economic structure is not similar to USSR. Hence, this study adopts the Tech Cold War phrase, which is defined as a geopolitical rivalry between superpowers trying to achieve supremacy over critical technologies. Moreover, all these discussions show that there is an urgent need to analyse the current situation to understand the inclinations in global power balances. Therefore, the main aims of this study are twofold. The first is analyzing the current situation of both countries from the view of microchip production and trade. And, the second is foresighting power balances of new global era. Since there is a shortage about the economic-policy analyses about this issue, it’s expected to make a contribution to the related literature.

Keywords

Semiconductor industry , microchips , economic policy , China

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