After the First World War, the victorious Allied powers were unable to
dispose of the Turkish question despite months of deliberation. The rivalry
of the Allİed powers, particularly of Great Britain and France, över the
lands of the old Ottoman Empire, the Greek occupation of Smyma in May
1919 and the subsequent rise of the Nationalİst Movement in the interior
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal *1 which resisted the post-war Allied adjustments and defied the inability of the Ottoman govemment to
save the country from foreign invasİon, ali combined to make such a treaty
impossible for the Allies. When anti-Nationalist Damad Ferid Paşa, the
Grand Vizier and the Sultan's son-in-law, was İn power on 5 April 1920 for
the fourth time, the British were confident that the Ottoman government in
Constantinople was önce again in their camp. In British eyes, Damad Ferid
was perhaps more sincerely convinced than any other statesman of the first
rank that Turkey’s sole hope of salvatioıı lay in a good understanding with
Great Britain. 2 Now, İt was time for the Allies to complete the Turkish treaty and force Damad Ferid to sign it. The Supreme council met at San
Remo on 18 April with such a purpose in mind.
After the First World War, the victorious Allied powers were unable to
dispose of the Turkish question despite months of deliberation. The rivalry
of the Allİed powers, particularly of Great Britain and France, över the
lands of the old Ottoman Empire, the Greek occupation of Smyma in May
1919 and the subsequent rise of the Nationalİst Movement in the interior
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal *1 which resisted the post-war Allied adjustments and defied the inability of the Ottoman govemment to
save the country from foreign invasİon, ali combined to make such a treaty
impossible for the Allies. When anti-Nationalist Damad Ferid Paşa, the
Grand Vizier and the Sultan's son-in-law, was İn power on 5 April 1920 for
the fourth time, the British were confident that the Ottoman government in
Constantinople was önce again in their camp. In British eyes, Damad Ferid
was perhaps more sincerely convinced than any other statesman of the first
rank that Turkey’s sole hope of salvatioıı lay in a good understanding with
Great Britain. 2 Now, İt was time for the Allies to complete the Turkish treaty and force Damad Ferid to sign it. The Supreme council met at San
Remo on 18 April with such a purpose in mind.
Birincil Dil | İngilizce |
---|---|
Bölüm | Makaleler |
Yazarlar | |
Yayımlanma Tarihi | 1 Eylül 1997 |
Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 1998 Cilt: 14 Sayı: 40 |