THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE: AN APPLIED ANALYSIS OF LOWEST ADVANCED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY

Abstract

The deterioration in fiscal discipline has become more permanent in the majority of developed and developing countries, as a result of increasing budget deficits in the direction of economic development and welfare state purposes after the Second World War. It is understood that the differentiation observed in fiscal balance in countries with similar development levels is not only explained by fiscal targets and macroeconomic shocks, but also political factors are influential. Hence, the aim of the study is to examine the impact of political factors on the fiscal balance in underdeveloped and developing countries. In accordance with this purpose, the effect of 14 variables representing political factors on public debt stock is analyzed by panel GMM method for a sample of 49 underdeveloped and developing countries over the period of 1985-2012. The results show that 11 of the political factors -which can be grouped into the regime, political stability, structure of parliament and government- have a significant effect on the public debt stock. Political Factors; Fiscal Discipline; Public Debt Stock; Panel GMM

 

Keywords

• Political Factors,Fiscal Discipline,Public Debt Stock,Panel GMM

MALİ DİSİPLİN ÜZERİNDE POLİTİK FAKTÖRLERİN ETKİSİ: AZ GELİŞMİŞ VE GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELERE YÖNELİK UYGULAMALI BİR ANALİZ

Abstract

İkinci dünya savaşı sonrası ekonomik kalkınma ve refah devleti amaçları doğrultusunda artan bütçe açıkları sonucunda, mali disiplindeki bozulma hem gelişmiş hem gelişmekte olan ülkelerin çoğunda kalıcı hale gelmiştir. Benzer gelişmişlik düzeyine sahip ülkelerde kamu mali dengesinde gözlemlenen farklılaşma sadece mali hedefler ve makroekonomik şoklarla açıklanamamakta, bunlara ilave olarak, politik faktörlerin de etkili olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Buradan hareketle, çalışmanın amacı, az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde politik faktörlerin kamu mali dengesi üzerindeki etkisinin incelenmesidir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda 1985-2012 yılları arasında 49 az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülke için politik faktörleri temsil eden 14 değişkenin kamu borç stoku üzerindeki etkisi panel GMM yöntemi ile analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçlar yönetim biçimi, politik istikrar ile meclis ve hükümet yapısı şeklinde gruplandırılabilecek politik faktörlerinden 11 tanesinin kamu borç stoku üzerinde anlamlı etkisinin olduğunu göstermektedir. 

Keywords

• Politik Fak,Mali Disiplin,Kamu Borç Stoku,Panel GMM

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