MUHAFAZAKÂR MUHASEBE VE YÖNETİM KURULU YAPISI İLİŞKİSİNİN İNCELENMESİ

Year 2019, Volume: 6 Issue: 2, 351 - 369, 29.08.2019

Hüseyin Temiz , Merve Acar , Elçin Dalkılıç

https://doi.org/10.30798/makuiibf.527581

Abstract

Muhasebe uygulamaları varlıkların,
yükümlülüklerin ve dönem sonucunu gösteren kâr tutarının belirlenmesine ve
sunumuna dair düzenlemeler sayesinde gerçekleştirilmek-tedir. Bu düzenlemeler
de yöneticilere belirli noktalarda esneklik/tercih hakkı sunmaktadır. Söz
konusu tercih haklarının kullanılması sonucunda ise muhasebe sistemin-den
üretilen bilgiler farklılaşmaktadır.  Bu
çalışmanın amacı muhafazakâr (ihtiyatlı) muhasebe uygulamaları ve firma yönetim
kurulu yapısı arasındaki ilişkilerin incelenmesidir. Bu kapsamda BIST İmalat
Sektöründe faaliyet gösteren firmaların 2012-2016 yıllarını kapsayan veriler
kullanılarak incelemeler yapılmıştır. Muhafa-zakârlık düzeyi koşulsuz ve koşullu
olmak üzere iki grupta incelenmiştir. Elde edilen bulgulara göre, ör-neklem ve
inceleme dönemi itibariyle, firmaların yönetim kurulu yapıları ve koşulsuz
muhafazakârlık düzeyleri arasında bir ilişki olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Diğer
taraftan koşullu muhafazakârlık kapsamında yönetim kurulu büyüklüğü artmasının
muhafazakârlık düzeyini düşür-düğüne dair kanıtlar elde edilmiştir.

Keywords

Muhafazakar muhasebe, BIST İmalat Sektörü, Yönetim Yapısı, imalat sektörü

INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM AND BOARD STRUCTURE

Abstract

Accounting practices are implemented through the
regulations for the determination and presentation of the assets, liabilities and
the profit amount representing the period result. These regulations also
provide managers with the flexibility / choice right at certain situations. As
a result of the use of these rights, the information generated from the
accounting system becomes different. The aim of this study is to investigate
the association between conservative (prudent) accounting practices and firms’
board structure. In this context, the companies which operate in BIST
Manufacturing Sector have been examined by using the data covering 2012-2016.
The level of conservatism is examined in two groups as unconditional and
conditional conservatism. According to the findings, as of the sample and
investigation period, it is determined that there is no relationship between
the board structures and unconditional conservatism levels of firms. On the
other hand, in the context of conditional conservatism, there is evidence that
the increase in the board size reduces the level of conditional conservatism.

Keywords

Accounting Conservatism, BIST Manufacturing Sector, Board Structure

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