Assessing the Regulatory Impact of the Turkish Competition Authority on Market Dynamics: A Statistical Approach Using Kernel Estimation and its Simulation

Year 2024, Volume: 11 Issue: 2, 837 - 853, 30.06.2024

Murat Aydın , Mehmet Niyazi Çankaya

https://doi.org/10.30798/makuiibf.1436807

Abstract

Established in Turkey in 1994, the Competition Authority plays a key role in safeguarding and promoting competition in markets. Its main tasks include monitoring agreements, detecting collusive practices and preventing the formation of cartels, as well as conducting inspections to thwart monopolistic tendencies. It also ensures healthy competition by monitoring mergers and acquisitions. The Authority's decisions have a profound impact on the market for goods and services, promoting better opportunities for consumers. Its effective and independent functioning is essential for Turkey's sustainable economic growth and the functioning of the competitive market mechanism. Through statistical evaluations, this study aims to assess the impact of the authority in preventing imperfect competition in Turkey's goods and services markets. The analysis of the Competition Law and related legislation sheds light on the Authority's role and regulatory tools, while statistical trends reveal its proactive stance in regulating competition infringements and maintaining a fair market environment.

Keywords

administrative fine, computation, statistics, Turkish competition authority, merger

Ethical Statement

As the authors of this study, we declare that we do not have any ethics committee approval and/or informed consent statement.

Supporting Institution

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Project Number

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Thanks

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