A New Approach to the Battle of Magnesia (190 BCE): A Game Theory Model

Abstract

Antiochus III the Great, the Seleucid king, who emerged as a powerful king in the east, expanded the borders of his kingdom from Syria to the west during his reign of about forty years, his activities in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, his intervention in Hellas and his attacks on cities allied with Rome brought about some developments. In 190 BCE, the army consisting of the Romans and their allies, and the forces led by the Seleucid king Antiochus III measured swords in Magnesia. This study aims to make a new proposal about the battlefield stated by Kromayer and to question whether the Battle of Magnesia can be handled in the context of game theory by considering the behavior patterns and alternative strategies of the actors involved in the war. In this context, a sequential and zero-sum game consisting of two players and two move options is modelled and an analysis is made with equilibrium solution methods such as backward induction and iterated elimination of dominated strategies in game theory. As a result of the game-theoretical analysis, it was determined that the dominant strategy of the Romans was to fight in every situation, and it was obtained that the Seleucids' avoidance of war was the optimal move, contrary to what happened in history.

Keywords

• Asia Minor
• Romans
• Seleucids
• Battle of Magnesia
• Game Theory

Magnesia Savaşı’na (MÖ 190) Dair Yeni Bir Yaklaşım: Bir Oyun Teorisi Modeli

Öz

Doğuda güçlü bir kral olarak ortaya çıkan Seleukos kralı III. Antiokhos’un yaklaşık kırk yıllık saltanatı boyunca krallığının sınırlarını Syria’dan batıya doğru genişletmesi, Akdeniz ve Ege civarındaki faaliyetleri, Hellas’a müdahalesi ve Roma müttefiki kentlere yaptığı saldırılar birtakım gelişmeleri beraberinde getirmiştir. MÖ 190 yılında Romalılar ve müttefiklerinden oluşan orduyla, Seleukos kralı III. Antiokhos önderliğindeki güçler Magnesia’da karşılaşmışlardır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Kromayer’in belirttiği savaş alanı ile ilgili yeni bir öneride bulunmak ve savaşa dahil olan aktörlerin davranış biçimlerini, alternatif stratejilerini göz önünde bulundurarak Magnesia Savaşı’nın oyun teorisi bağlamında ele alınıp alınamayacağını sorgulamaktır. Bu kapsamda iki oyuncu ve ikişer hamle seçeneğinden oluşan ardışık ve sıfır toplamlı bir oyun modellenmiş ve oyun teorisinde yer alan geriye doğru çıkarsama ve domine edilmiş stratejilerin elenmesi gibi denge çözüm yöntemleri ile bir analiz yapılmıştır. Analiz neticesinde Romalıların dominant stratejisinin her durumda savaşmak olduğu tespit edilmiş, Seleukosların ise tarihte yaşananın aksine savaştan kaçınmasının optimal hamlesi olduğu oyun teorik bağlamda elde edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Küçük Asia
• Romalılar
• Seleukoslar
• Magnesia Savaşı
• Oyun Teorisi

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