Kuzey İrlanda’da ‘Gönülsüz Barış’ın İnşası

Abstract

Bu makale Kuzey İrlanda sorununu etno-milliyetçi çatışmanın başladığı andan, yani 1969’daki Büyük Sıkıntı’dan barış sürecinin başladığı yani 1993’de imzalanan Downing Street Deklerasyonu’na kadar geçen zamana kadar, politika yapıcılarının çatışmanın seyrini değiştiren siyasi, şiddet içermeyen çözüm çabaları bağlamında analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma, yüksekyoğunluklu çatışma sürerken çatışan tarafların barış yapımına ilişkin algılarını ölçebilmek için, çatışma çözümü teorisinin rakip algısı, siyasi yönelimler ve çatışan tarafların kararlarını belirleyen temel faktörlerinden faydalanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken literatüre üçlü bir analiz yöntemi sunmaktadır: partiler arası işbirliği, popüler destek, ve silahlı çatışma ve siyasi mücadelenin birbiri yerine kullanılması. Bu analizi gerçekleştirebilmek için çatışmanın başladığı ilk dönemdeki barış çalışmalarının şiddeti azaltmadaki ve resmi görüşmeler başlamadan önce barışı inşa etmedeki rolüne ilişkin zengin bir arşiv analizinden faydalanılmaktadır. Bu makalenin iddiası; literatürde iddia edildiğinin aksine, barış çalışmalarının 1990’lardaki resmi görüşmelerden ibaret olmadığıdır. Çalışmanın bulgusu; siyasi konferanslar, ve doğrudan ve dolaylı görüşmeler yoluyla Kuzey İrlanda siyasi partilerinin, ve İngiliz ve İrlanda Hükümetleri’nin çok yönlü görüşmelerden çok önce barış çalışmalarını başlattığı yönündedir. Ancak, siyasi parti ve aktörlerin isteksiz tavırları bu dönemde çözümü engellemiştir.

Keywords

• Barış süreci,Kuzey İrlanda,Çatışma çözümü,Barış yapımı,Siyasi partiler

The Making of ‘Hesitant Peace’ in Northern Ireland

Abstract

This article examines the early stage of the Northern Ireland conflict from the beginning of the ethno-nationalist conflict called the Troubles of 1969 to the beginning of the ‘peace process’ through the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 by focusing on a process of political, non-violent resolution efforts of political agents, which affected the route of the conflict. It utilises conflict resolution approaches to determine the variables with regards to the perceptions, positions, and decisions of conflicting parties, which provide an understanding of their role in peacemaking during the highintensity conflict. Particularly, it offers three major aspects for analysis: inter-party collaboration, popular support, and interchangeability between armed and political struggle. It uses rich data from archival documents to analyse the influence of early peace efforts to de-escalate the conflict and establish foundations for peace prior to official negotiations. It argues that peace efforts do not consist of official negotiations in the 1990s. The article finds that they had been initiated long before multilateral negotiations through political conferences, direct and indirect dialogues between major political parties in Northern Ireland, and the British and Irish governments. However, the reluctance of political agents towards peace prevented making progress towards peace.

Keywords

• Peace process,Northern Ireland,Conflict Resolution,Peacemaking,Political parties

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