RESCUING INTERPRETATION FROM LAW
Abstract
Classical legal literature discusses the issue of the interpretation of legal texts
under the title of ‘legal interpretation’. This expression implies that there is a
kind or method of interpretation which is exclusively peculiar to legal reasoning
and legal decision-making. This article rejects this assumption and suggests that
interpretation is not a legal issue. First argument of the article is the impossibility
of finding criteria to be used for distinguishing texts as legal/normative, literary/
fictional, historical etc. Second argument questions traditional legal reasoning
approach’s goal of truth and certainty. Last argument attempts to refute the idea
of the autonomy of law as a discipline. To support his claim, the author uses
Kelsen’s account of interpretation which presents the judge having no limits
on his interpretive discretion and Gadamer’s acceptation of legal hermeneutics
as a model of his hermeneutical theory. In the conclusion, the article presents
some implications of accepting interpretation as a non-legal issue.
Keywords
Legal interpretation, legal reasoning, hermeneutics, interpretation theory
References
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