İşletmelerde vekalet teorisinin öngörü ve varsayımları bağlamında yönetim olgusuna genel bir bakış

Year 2012, Issue: 27, 62 - 84, 01.10.2012

Seyfi Top Ercan Öge

Abstract

Acente (vekalet) yaklaşımı, modern işletmelerde ve büyüyen ve kurumsallaşan işletmelerin sahip-yöneticiçalışan ilişkilerini açıklamaktadır. Günümüzde küçük işletmelere de uygulanmaktadır. Vekalet yaklaşımında sahipler, (girişimciler, paydaşlar ve patronlar) vekalet veren olarak, çalışanlar, yöneticiler, tedarikçiler, müşteriler v.b. de işveren vekili veya acente olarak öngörülür. Vekalet ilişkisinde vekiller, işverenlerin menfaatlerini korumak ve çıkarlarını maksimize etmek (işi yapmak) üzere istihdam edilirler; ancak zaman zaman acenteler kendi amaç ve çıkarlarını da takip edebilirler. Bu amaç ve çıkar farklılıkları tarafları birbirlerine karşı eyleme geçmeye sevk edebilir. Bu durum ilişki, acente ve yönetim işlemlerine neden olur. İşletmelerin etkinliğe dayalı gereklilik sınırları; maliyete ve kayıplara yol açabilecek bu gibi genel ve özel işlemlerin, işletmelerin sınırları içinde veya dışında veya bunların karışımı bir ağ içinde tutulabilmelerini gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada işletmelerde yönetim bağlamında vekalet (acente) teorisine genel bir bakış ile tüm varsayımları bir bütünlük içinde ele alınarak incelenmektedir

Keywords

Vekalet Maliyetleri, İlişki Maliyetleri, Sözleşme ve Saklı Bilgi, Örtük Bilgi

An Overview of the Agency Theory’s Context of Forecast and Assumptions For the Management Phenomenon in Businesses

Abstract

Agency theory, in modern business, (public and private corporations) and growing businesses described relationship among owner-manager-employee. Also today it is applied to small businesses. In agency approach owners (entrepreneurs, stakeholders and bosses) are foreseen as giving power of attorney and employees, managers, suppliers, customers, etc. are also foreseen as representative of the employer or as an agent. At this relationship employees are employed by protecting the interests of employers and to maximize the interests of ownership. However agents from time to time may pursue their own goals and interests.These differences of interests and purpose may refer the parties to take action against each other. This situation may cause to the relationship, agents, and management transaction. Such general and private transactions may lead to loss and cost must be required the enterprises based on the effectiveness limits within inside and outside the boundaries of firms or keeping in a network a combination of these. At this study, agency approach in the field of management is examined how to manage these different interests and relationships according to its assumption

Keywords

Agency Cost, Relational Cost, Contract, Tacit Knowledge and Asymmetric Information.

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