THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Year 2023, Volume: 10 Issue: 21, 57 - 79, 28.04.2023

Tolga Erdem , Cengiz Özbek

https://doi.org/10.58884/akademik-hassasiyetler.1218115

Cited By: 1

Abstract

The weapons that have self-controlling capacity and are equipped with the technology to independently choose and destroy a target are called autonomous weapons. Presently, autonomous weapon technology is developed to contribute to the defence and offensive capacities of states and restructure their armies. However, there is a common concern that the quality of autonomous weapons to make decisions in the international arena independent of humans may cause a global security problem. In this respect, the United Nations (UN) supports disarmament by holding meetings and issuing reports to ensure that these weapons are controlled while under development.
The present article intends to clarify the activities of the UN which aim to control autonomous weapon technology. The first part of the article defines autonomous weapons in detail and then evaluates their possible benefits and threats. Later on, the article provides an outline of the disarmament endeavours with regard to autonomous weapons. The final part, on the other hand, discusses the disarmament activities of the UN as to autonomous weapons. In this sense, the official documents of the UN were selected as primary sources in revealing the global aspect of the disarmament struggles concerning autonomous weapons. This article, therefore, uses the document analysis method. In consequence of the document analysis, it was concluded that more data were required to establish a consensus as to the performance of a wider disarmament activities under the UN regarding autonomous weapons.

Keywords

The United Nations, Deadly Autonomous Weapon Systems, Disarmament, Autonomous Weapons, Security

BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER PERSPEKTİFİNDEN YAPAY ZEKÂ TEKNOLOJİSİNDE SİLAHSIZLANMA SORUNU: OTONOM SİLAHLAR VE KÜRESEL GÜVENLİK

Abstract

Otonom silahlar, kendi kendini kontrol edebilme yeteneğine sahip olan ve bağımsız şekilde hedefini seçerek yok edebilecek teknolojiyle donatılmış silahlardır. Günümüzde otonom silah teknolojisi, devletlerin savunma ve saldırı kabiliyetlerine katkı sağlanması ve orduların yeniden yapılandırılması amacıyla geliştirilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, otonom silahların uluslararası alanda insandan bağımsız olarak karar verme yeteneğinin küresel boyutta bir güvenlik sorunu oluşturabileceğinden endişe duyulmaktadır. Bu yüzden Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), söz konusu silahların henüz gelişim aşamasında kontrol altına alınması için çeşitli toplantı ve raporlar ile silahsızlanmayı desteklemektedir.
Bu çalışmada, otonom silah teknolojisinin kontrolüne yönelik BM’nin yürüttüğü çalışmalara açıklık getirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde otonom silahlar detaylandırılacak, ardından otonom silahların olası faydalarına ve zararlarına ilişkin değerlendirmeler yapılacaktır. Ardından, otonom silahlar konusundaki silahsızlanma çalışmaları genel hatlarıyla incelenecektir. Son bölümde ise BM’nin otonom silahlar konusundaki silahsızlanma çalışmaları ele alınacaktır. Bu bağlamda otonom silahlara dair silahsızlanma çabalarının küresel niteliğinin ortaya konulmasında BM’nin resmi belgeleri birincil kaynak olarak tercih edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla çalışmada doküman analizi yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Doküman analizi sonucunda BM’de otonom silahlara dair geniş çaplı bir silahsızlanma çalışması yapılması konusunda fikir birliğine varılması için daha fazla verinin gerektiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Keywords

Birleşmiş Milletler, Öldürücü Özerk Silah Sistemleri, Silahsızlanma, Otonom Silahlar, Güvenlik

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