Uluslararası Sistem ve İstikrar: Kavramsal Bir Değerlendirme

Year 2015, Volume: 10 Issue: 1, 209 - 229, 24.04.2015

Hasan Yalçın

https://doi.org/10.17550/aid.74205

Abstract

Bu çalışma uluslararası sistem ve istikrar üzerinedir. Farklı teorik perspektiflerimukayese ederek, kutupluluk ile istikrar arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışır.Uluslararası sistemler sistem içerisindeki güç dağılımına göre tek kutuplu,çift kutuplu ve çok kutuplu yapılar olarak isimlendirilir. Bu yapılardan hangisinindaha istikrarlı olduğu üzerine uzun tartışmalar yaşanmıştır. Bahsigeçen tartışmaların ana gündem maddesi hangi uluslararası güç dağılımınındaha istikrarlı olduğu üzerinedir. Önceleri çok kutuplu yapının daha istikrarlıolduğu düşünülürken, zaman içerisinde çift kutuplu sistemlerin dahaistikrarlı olduğu iddiası yaygınlık kazanmıştır. Günümüzde ise tek kutuplusistemlerin çift kutuplu sistemlere kıyasla daha istikrarlı olabileceği fikri öneçıkmaktadır. Çalışma bu ilişki üzerine yapılan tartışmaların arkasındaki ikitemel teorik mantığı ortaya koyar: güdüler mantığı ve mecburiyetler mantığı.Mecburiyet mantığı uluslararası istikrarı öngörmede daha başarılı gibigörünmesine rağmen, bu mantığın temel teorik sorunları olmadığı söylenemez.Çalışma kutupluluk ile istikrar arasındaki ilişkiyi teorik olarak açıklamakve öngörmek adına imkânlar mantığını teklif etmektedir. Bu mantığagöre uluslararası istikrar devletlerin imkân hesaplamalarının bir sonucu olarakgörülebilir.

Keywords

Uluslararası Sistem, Uluslararası İstikrar, Kutupluluk, Güç Dağılımı

International System and Stability: A Conceptual Assessment

Abstract

This study is about international system and stability. By comparing different theoretical approaches, it discusses the relation between polarity and stability. It is quite common to identify international systems as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar structures. There is a wide ranging discussion over which one of these structures represents the most stable system. Although multipolar structures were admitted as more stable previously, later the claim of bipolar stability became more common. Recently, the idea that unipolar structures are more stable compared to bipolar structures has gained more ground. This study identifies two main theoretical logics behind the discussions over the relation between polarity and stability: a logic of motivations and a logic of obligations. Although the logic of obligations appears as doing better than the logic of motivations in predicting international stability, it has its own theoretical shortcomings. The study further offers the logic possibilities in order to theoretically explain and predict the relation between polarity and stability. According to this logic, international stability can be considered an outcome of states’ calculations of possibilities

Keywords

International System, International Polarity, International

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