The 2012 Tuareg-Arab Uprising in Northern Mali and Regional Actors: The Impact of Libya and Algeria

Abstract

Sahel’de güvenlik ve istikrarı tehdit eden temel çatışmalardan biri olan Mali’nin kuzeyindeki Tuareg-Arap ayaklanması 2015 Cezayir Barış Antlaşmasına rağmen günümüzde de devam etmektedir. Söz konusu krizin hem gelişiminde hem de çözüm çalışmalarında bölgesel aktörleri rolleri göz ardı edilemez önemdedir. Bu makale, Mali’de 2012 yılında başlayıp günümüzde ise yeniden şiddetlenerek devam eden krizin gelişimini Libya ve Cezayir’in bölgesel politikaları üzerinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. İki ülkenin de güney şehirlerinde çok sayıda Tuareg kabilesinin yaşaması, Mali’deki krizle yakından ilgilenip sürece dahil olmalarına neden olmuştur. Libya’nın devrik lideri Muammer Kaddafi, pan-afrikanist politikaları çerçevesinde Tuareg toplumunun en büyük destekçisi olmuştur. 1980’lerde Libya’ya sığınan Tuareg gençleri daha sonra ülkelerine dönüp 1990 ayaklanmasını başlatmakla kalmamış, bu süreç 2012 ayaklanmasının temellerini de oluşturmuştu. Tuaregler’in ruhani babası olarak Kaddafi’nin 2011’deki ani ölümü de Mali’nin kuzeyindeki 2012 isyanının temel sebepleri arasında gösterilmektedir. Öte yandan güney şehirlerinde yoğun Tuareg nüfusu bulunduran Cezayir ise yalnızca 2012 isyanında değil 1960’lardan itibaren Mali’de yaşanan ayaklanmalarda arabuluculuk görevini üstlenmiş ve 2015 yılında Mali'de Barış ve Uzlaşma Anlaşması’na ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Bu makale, söz konusu krize dair çalışmaların çoğunlukla uluslararası aktörlere odaklanmış olmasına rağmen literatürde yeterince yer bulamayan Mağrip-Sahel ilişkilerini bölgesel bir perspektiften mercek altına alması açısından önemlidir. Mali krizi etrafında bölgesel göç, Sahel jeopolitiği ve güvenlik meselelerine ek olarak post kolonyal bir perspektiften trans nasyonal kimlikler, azınlık sorunları ve bölgesel göç meselelerine değinmesi bölgeye dair kapsamlı bir anlayış sağlayacaktır.

Keywords

• Tuaregler
• Mali
• Libya
• Cezayir
• Sahel
• Ayaklanma

The 2012 Tuareg-Arab Uprising in Northern Mali and Regional Actors: The Impact of Libya and Algeria

Abstract

Despite the peace agreement signed in Algeria in 2015, the Tuareg-Arab uprising in northern Mali is still one of the main conflicts that threaten security and stability in the Sahel. Regional actors played an undeniable role both in the development of the crisis and in the solution attempts. For this reason, this article aims to examine the development of the crisis that started in Mali in 2012 and continues today through the regional policies of Libya and Algeria. The fact that many Tuareg tribes lived in the southern cities of both countries caused them to be closely involved in the crisis in Mali and to be involved in the process. Muammar Gaddafi, the former leader of Libya, has been the biggest supporter of the Tuareg society within the framework of his pan-Africanist policies. The Tuareg youth who took refuge in Libya in the 1980s not only returned to their country and started the 1990 uprising, but also laid the foundations for the 2012 uprising. As the spiritual father of Tuaregs, Gaddafi's sudden death in 2011 is also cited as one of the main reasons for the 2012 rebellion in northern Mali. On the other hand, Algeria, which has a large Tuareg population in its southern cities, acted as a mediator not only in the 2012 uprising but also in the uprisings in Mali since the 1960s . They hosted the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali in 2015. This article is important in that it examines Maghreb-Sahel relations from a regional perspective, which cannot find enough space in the literature where existing studies on the crisis mostly focus on international actors. By evaluating transnational identities, minority issues and regional migration from a postcolonial perspective in supplement to political mobilization and regional security issues around the Mali crisis, this paper will provide a comprehensive understanding of the region.

Keywords

• Tuaregs
• Mali
• Libya
• Algeria
• Sahel
• Insurrection

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