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Political Monetary Cycles in Turkey: SARIMA Analysis For The Period 1986-2016

Year 2021, Volume: 9 Issue: 5, 1381 - 1401, 25.10.2021
https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.761615

Abstract

According to political opportunistic monetary fluctuations, the government is conducting an expansionary monetary policy before the election, influencing the central bank in order to be re-elected. In this way, the government aims to gain the support of voters by creating non-permanent improvements in macroeconomic indicators. In order to ensure long-term economic stability immediately after the election, contractionary monetary policies are implemented. The use of monetary policies by the government in its own interests during the election period creates fluctuations in the economy. The purpose of this article is to examine whether political opportunistic monetary fluctuations were valid in Turkey between 1986-2016. In the study, monthly circulaiton money(M0), M1 money supply, M2 money supply, M3 money supply, domestic loan amount and interbank interest rate variables were used for the related period. The changes of these variables before and after the election were examined by the SARIMA method. Accordingly, except the interbank interest rate other variables were found to act in accordance with assumptions of political opportunistic monetary fluctuations. Contrary to the assumptions, interbank interest rates increased before the election and decreased after the election. Due to the fact that the interbank interest rate is sensitive to changes in internal and external factors, it becomes difficult to change it with electoral concerns. As a result, it can be said that there were generally political opportunistic monetary fluctuations on monetary policy indicators in Turkey during the 1986-2016 period.

References

  • Akarca, Ali T. & Tansel, A. (2004). Economic performance and political outcomes: An analysis of the 1995 Turkish parliamentary election results, ERC Working Paper in Economic 04/01, 1- 22.
  • Alesina, A. & Summers, L. H. (1993). Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(1), 151- 162.
  • Alesina, A., Roubini, N. & Cohen, G. D. (1997). Political cycles and the macroeconomy, England: The MIT Press.
  • Alpanda, S. & Honig, A. (2009). The impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(7), 1365–1389.
  • Asutay, M. (2005). Political monetary cycles: The political manipulation of monetary policy instruments and outcomes in Turkey. Durham: 25th Annual Conference of the Public Choice Society (31 Mart- 3 Nisan).
  • Aydemir, G. (2007). Türkiye’de politik konjonktür dalgalanmaları kapsamında seçmen davranışlarının analizi (1987- 2004), (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
  • Bakırtaş, İ. & Koyuncu, C. (2005). Politik dalgalanmalar yaklaşımı çerçevesinde Türkiye’deki seçimlerin ekonometrik analizi. Atatürk Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, 19(1), 55- 66.
  • Beck, N. (1987). Elections and FED: Is there political monetary cycle? American Journal of Political Science, 31(1), 194-216.
  • Belke, N. & Potrafke, N. (2012). Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 31, 1126-1139.
  • Berger, H. & Woitek, U. (1999). Further observations on the political business cycle in German monetary aggregates. CES: University of Munich and University of Glasgow.
  • Caporale, T. (2003). Political pressure, rhetoric and monetary policy. The Economic Record, Vol. 79, 512-526.
  • Chappell, H. W. & Keech, W. R. (1988). The unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies. Southern Economic Journal, 55(1), 107- 122.
  • Clark W. R. & Hallerberg, M. (2000). Mobile capital, domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy. American Political Science Review, 48(3), 323-346.
  • Cukierman, A., Webb, S. & Neyaptı, B. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353-398.
  • De Paso, G. (2000). Partizan appointments to the central bank: Policy uncertainty and the democratic deficit. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 22, 471-489.
  • Derin, İ. (2002). Do political business cycles exist in Turkey? (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), The Faculty of Claremont Graduate University, California.
  • Drazen, A. (2001). The political business cycle after 25 years. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 75- 138.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2004). Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review, 15(1), 5-22.
  • Eryılmaz, F. (2015). The effects of elections on Turkish economy: Evidence from money supply. Turkey at the beginning of 21. century: Past and present (Chapter 37), St. Kliment Ohridski University Press: 508-519.
  • Eryılmaz, F. & Murat, D. (2016). Political business cycles theories: Evidence from Turkey. Yönetim ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi, 14(1), 248-268.
  • Friedman, M. & Goodhart, C. (2002). Money, inflation and constitutional position of the central bank. The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1-127.
  • Grier, K. B. (1987). Presidential elections and federal reserve policy: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal, 54(2), 475–486.
  • Grier, K. B. (1989). On the existence of a political monetary cycle. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 376–389.
  • Haynes, S. E. & Stone, J. A. (1989). An integrated test for electoral cycles in the U.S. economy. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(3), 426-434.
  • Hayo, B. & Hefeker, C. (2001). Do we really need central bank independence?, http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mac/papers/0103/0103006.pdf, (Erişim: 20.06.2016).
  • Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467- 1487.
  • Leertouwer, E. & Maier, P. (2001). Who creates political business cycles? Shoulds central bank be blamed? European Journal of Political Economy, 17(3), 445-463.
  • Maier, P., De Haan, J. & Sturm, J. (2000). Political pressure on the bundesbank: An empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach. http://www.philipp-maier.de/download/JOM.pdf, (Erişim: 17.05.2016).
  • Nordhaus, William D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 42, 169-190.
  • Özkan, F. (2010). Politik konjonktür dalgalanmaları (Türkiye Analizi). Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi).
  • Özkan, F. & Tarı, R. (2011). Türkiye’de seçim dönemlerinin politik konjonktürel dalgalanmaları teorisi çerçevesinde analizi. http://iibf.erciyes.edu.tr/dergi/sayi36/013_ozkan-tari.pdf, (Erişim: 20.08.2016).
  • Polat, Ö. (2009). Türkiye’nin dış ticaret verilerinin öngörüsünde yapay sinir ağları ve Box-Jenkins modellerinin karşılaştırmalı analizi. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum.
  • Saeki, M. & Shull, S. (2003). Who influences the FED? Presidential versus congressional leadership. Journal of Public Policy, 23(3), 261-278.
  • Sayan, S. & Berument, H. (1997). Türkiye'de siyaset, ekonomik popülizm ve hükümetler. H. Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 5(2), 1- 21.
  • Sevüktekin, M. & Çınar, M. (2014). Ekonometrik Zaman Serileri Analizi. Bursa: Dora Yayınevi.
  • Sieg, G. (2001). A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, 39-52.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2017a). Political monetary cycles in coalition and single party goverment periods: A case study on Turkey. Annals of the Constantin Brancuşi University of Targu Jiu Economy Series, Issue 6/2017: 89-111.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2017b). Esnek kur rejiminde politik döviz kuru dalgalanmalarının varlığı: Türkiye örneği. Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 5(63), 423-442.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2018). Endojen para arzının politik yönü: Türkiye için Toda-Yamamoto nedensellik analizinin uygulanması. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 5(26), 89-107.

Türkiye’de Politik Parasal Dalgalanmalar: 1986-2016 Dönemi İçin SARIMA Analizi

Year 2021, Volume: 9 Issue: 5, 1381 - 1401, 25.10.2021
https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.761615

Abstract

Politik fırsatçı parasal dalgalanmalara göre iktidar yeniden seçilebilmek için merkez bankasını etkileyerek seçimden önce genişletici para politikası yapmaktadır. Bu yolla iktidar makroekonomik göstergelerde kalıcı olmayan iyileşmeler yaratarak seçmenlerin desteğini kazanmayı hedeflemektedir. Seçimden hemen sonra uzun vadeli ekonomik istikrarı sağlayabilmek için daraltıcı para politikaları uygulanmaktadır. Seçim döneminde para politikalarının iktidar tarafından kendi çıkarlarına yönelik kullanımı ekonomide dalgalanmalar yaratmaktadır. Bu makalenin temel amacı Türkiye’de 1986-2016 yılları arasında politik fırsatçı parasal dalgalanmaların geçerli olup olmadığını incelemektir. Çalışmada ilgili döneme ait aylık dolaşımdaki para(M0), M1 para arzı, M2 para arzı, M3 para arzı, yurtiçi kredi miktarı ve bankalar arası(interbank) faiz oranı değişkenleri kullanılmıştır. Bu değişkenlerin seçim öncesi ve sonrası değişimleri SARIMA yöntemiyle incelenmiştir. Buna göre bankalararası faiz oranı hariç diğer değişkenler politik fırsatçı parasal dalgalanmaların varsayımlarına uygun olarak hareket ettiği tespit edilmiştir. Bankalararası faiz oranı ise varsayımların aksine seçim öncesinde arttığı seçim sonrasında azaldığı görülmektedir. Bankalararası faiz oranının iç ve dış etmenlerdeki değişime duyarlı olmasından dolayı seçimsel kaygılarla değiştirilmesi zorlaşmaktadır. Sonuç olarak Türkiye’de 1986-2016 döneminde para politikası göstergeleri üzerinde genel olarak politik fırsatçı parasal dalgalanmaların geçerli olduğu söylenebilir.

References

  • Akarca, Ali T. & Tansel, A. (2004). Economic performance and political outcomes: An analysis of the 1995 Turkish parliamentary election results, ERC Working Paper in Economic 04/01, 1- 22.
  • Alesina, A. & Summers, L. H. (1993). Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(1), 151- 162.
  • Alesina, A., Roubini, N. & Cohen, G. D. (1997). Political cycles and the macroeconomy, England: The MIT Press.
  • Alpanda, S. & Honig, A. (2009). The impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(7), 1365–1389.
  • Asutay, M. (2005). Political monetary cycles: The political manipulation of monetary policy instruments and outcomes in Turkey. Durham: 25th Annual Conference of the Public Choice Society (31 Mart- 3 Nisan).
  • Aydemir, G. (2007). Türkiye’de politik konjonktür dalgalanmaları kapsamında seçmen davranışlarının analizi (1987- 2004), (Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
  • Bakırtaş, İ. & Koyuncu, C. (2005). Politik dalgalanmalar yaklaşımı çerçevesinde Türkiye’deki seçimlerin ekonometrik analizi. Atatürk Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, 19(1), 55- 66.
  • Beck, N. (1987). Elections and FED: Is there political monetary cycle? American Journal of Political Science, 31(1), 194-216.
  • Belke, N. & Potrafke, N. (2012). Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 31, 1126-1139.
  • Berger, H. & Woitek, U. (1999). Further observations on the political business cycle in German monetary aggregates. CES: University of Munich and University of Glasgow.
  • Caporale, T. (2003). Political pressure, rhetoric and monetary policy. The Economic Record, Vol. 79, 512-526.
  • Chappell, H. W. & Keech, W. R. (1988). The unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies. Southern Economic Journal, 55(1), 107- 122.
  • Clark W. R. & Hallerberg, M. (2000). Mobile capital, domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy. American Political Science Review, 48(3), 323-346.
  • Cukierman, A., Webb, S. & Neyaptı, B. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353-398.
  • De Paso, G. (2000). Partizan appointments to the central bank: Policy uncertainty and the democratic deficit. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 22, 471-489.
  • Derin, İ. (2002). Do political business cycles exist in Turkey? (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), The Faculty of Claremont Graduate University, California.
  • Drazen, A. (2001). The political business cycle after 25 years. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 75- 138.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2004). Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review, 15(1), 5-22.
  • Eryılmaz, F. (2015). The effects of elections on Turkish economy: Evidence from money supply. Turkey at the beginning of 21. century: Past and present (Chapter 37), St. Kliment Ohridski University Press: 508-519.
  • Eryılmaz, F. & Murat, D. (2016). Political business cycles theories: Evidence from Turkey. Yönetim ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi, 14(1), 248-268.
  • Friedman, M. & Goodhart, C. (2002). Money, inflation and constitutional position of the central bank. The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1-127.
  • Grier, K. B. (1987). Presidential elections and federal reserve policy: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal, 54(2), 475–486.
  • Grier, K. B. (1989). On the existence of a political monetary cycle. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 376–389.
  • Haynes, S. E. & Stone, J. A. (1989). An integrated test for electoral cycles in the U.S. economy. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71(3), 426-434.
  • Hayo, B. & Hefeker, C. (2001). Do we really need central bank independence?, http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mac/papers/0103/0103006.pdf, (Erişim: 20.06.2016).
  • Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467- 1487.
  • Leertouwer, E. & Maier, P. (2001). Who creates political business cycles? Shoulds central bank be blamed? European Journal of Political Economy, 17(3), 445-463.
  • Maier, P., De Haan, J. & Sturm, J. (2000). Political pressure on the bundesbank: An empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach. http://www.philipp-maier.de/download/JOM.pdf, (Erişim: 17.05.2016).
  • Nordhaus, William D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 42, 169-190.
  • Özkan, F. (2010). Politik konjonktür dalgalanmaları (Türkiye Analizi). Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi).
  • Özkan, F. & Tarı, R. (2011). Türkiye’de seçim dönemlerinin politik konjonktürel dalgalanmaları teorisi çerçevesinde analizi. http://iibf.erciyes.edu.tr/dergi/sayi36/013_ozkan-tari.pdf, (Erişim: 20.08.2016).
  • Polat, Ö. (2009). Türkiye’nin dış ticaret verilerinin öngörüsünde yapay sinir ağları ve Box-Jenkins modellerinin karşılaştırmalı analizi. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum.
  • Saeki, M. & Shull, S. (2003). Who influences the FED? Presidential versus congressional leadership. Journal of Public Policy, 23(3), 261-278.
  • Sayan, S. & Berument, H. (1997). Türkiye'de siyaset, ekonomik popülizm ve hükümetler. H. Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 5(2), 1- 21.
  • Sevüktekin, M. & Çınar, M. (2014). Ekonometrik Zaman Serileri Analizi. Bursa: Dora Yayınevi.
  • Sieg, G. (2001). A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, 39-52.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2017a). Political monetary cycles in coalition and single party goverment periods: A case study on Turkey. Annals of the Constantin Brancuşi University of Targu Jiu Economy Series, Issue 6/2017: 89-111.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2017b). Esnek kur rejiminde politik döviz kuru dalgalanmalarının varlığı: Türkiye örneği. Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 5(63), 423-442.
  • Tayyar, A. E. (2018). Endojen para arzının politik yönü: Türkiye için Toda-Yamamoto nedensellik analizinin uygulanması. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 5(26), 89-107.
There are 39 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Research Article
Authors

Ahmet Emrah Tayyar 0000-0003-2823-1700

Publication Date October 25, 2021
Acceptance Date June 23, 2021
Published in Issue Year 2021 Volume: 9 Issue: 5

Cite

APA Tayyar, A. E. (2021). Türkiye’de Politik Parasal Dalgalanmalar: 1986-2016 Dönemi İçin SARIMA Analizi. Anemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 9(5), 1381-1401. https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.761615

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