ÖRGÜTLERDE DENETİMLİ İŞBİRLİĞİ: BİLGİ YÖNETİMİ, PERFORMANS VE GÜVENİN ROLÜ

Year 2022, , 156 - 181, 20.12.2022

Nurcan Kemikkıran , Meral Kızrak

https://doi.org/10.54186/arhuss.1174007

Abstract

Vekâlet kuramı, asilin en az maliyetle azami kâr elde etmeye çalıştığını ve vekilin ise sadece denetim mekanizmaları ile asilin çıkarına hareket ettiğini öne sürerken, temsil kuramı vekilin aslında asilin menfaatleri doğrultusunda hareket etmeye istekli olduğunu ve bu nedenle işbirliği mekanizmalarının geliştirilmesi savunur. Örgütsel denetimin eksikliği, örgütsel hedeflerden sapmaya yol açarken, çok fazla kontrol de çalışanların özerkliğine, yaratıcılığına ve yenilikçiliğine zarar verebilir. Öte yandan, örgüt-içi işbirliği gereğinden fazla vurgulandığında, iş süreçlerinde ilişkisel risk ortaya çıkabilir. Bu nedenle, denetim ve işbirliğinin bir arada bulunması, örgütler için bir ikilem yaratır. Bu çalışmada bilgi yönetimi, performans yönetimi ve güven gibi değişkenlerin, örgütlerde denetimli işbirliğine nasıl katkıda bulunabileceği tartışılmış ve bu doğrultuda kuramsal önermeler geliştirilmiştir.

Keywords

Vekalet kuramı, Temsil kuramı, Örgütsel denetim, İşbirliği, Bilgi yönetimi

CONTROLLED COLLABORATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, PERFORMANCE AND TRUST

Abstract

While the agency theory posits that the principal tries to gain maximum profits with the least costs and the agent acts in the interest of the principal only with control mechanisms, the stewardship theory argues that the agent is motivated to act in the interests of the principal therefore coordination mechanisms should be developed. While the absence of organizational control may lead to diversion from organizational goals, too much control may harm employees' autonomy, creativity, and innovation. On the other hand, when organizations over emphasize collaboration, a relational risk may occur in work processes. So the coexistence of control and collaboration creates a dilemma for organizations. In this study we argue how knowledge management, performance management and trust may contribute to the unity of control and collaboration in organizations and accordingly develop theoretical propositions.

Keywords

Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Organizational control, Collaboration, Knowledge management

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