Karar Vermek Nedir: Kararlar ve Sahte-Kararlar

Abstract

Eylem felsefesinde “karar” kavramı, “niyet”, “eylem” ve “irade” kavramları gibi sorunlu olmasına rağmen, onlara kıyasla daha az incelenmiştir. Bu makale, “karar” kavramının kavramsal bir analizini sunarak, yalnızca bilinçli ve dünyanın zihne uymasını hedefleyen kararların gerçek kararlar olarak nitelendirilebileceğini savunmaktadır. Bu makalenin savunusuna göre kararların nesnesi eylemler değil, fikirlerdir. Daha açıkçası, bir kararın işlevi, eyleme götüren epistemik olarak mümkün fikir kümesini daraltmaktır. Dünyanın zihne uymasını hedefleyen bilişsel süreçler ile zihnin dünyaya uymasını hedefleyenleri ve bilinçli bilişsel süreçler ile bilinçsiz olanları ayıran iki boyutlu bir sınıflandırma sunan bu makale, karar-benzeri çeşitli bilişsel süreçleri incelemektedir. Bilinçdışı bilişsel süreçlerin ve dünyanın zihne uymasını hedefleyen bilişsel süreçlerin, duygusal eğilimlerle doğrudan bir nedensel bağlantı ve özne tarafından kontrol gibi karar vermenin gerekli özelliklerinden yoksun olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu analiz, daraltılmış bir “karar” kavramını savunmakta ve yaygın olarak “karar” olarak adlandırılan birçok karar-benzeri sürecin, bilinçli ve dünyanın zihne uymasını hedefleyen bilişsel süreçler ile felsefi veya bilimsel olarak anlamlı ve temel bir ortaklığa sahip olmadığını iddia etmektedir.

Keywords

• karar
• kavramsal analiz
• bilinçli kararlar
• bilinçdışı kararlar
• betimleyici kararlar
• normatif kararlar

What is a Decision: Decisions and Pseudo-Decisions

Abstract

In the philosophy of action, the concept of “decision” is relatively understudied compared to “intention,” “action,” and “will,” despite being just as philosophically problematic. This paper provides a conceptual analysis of “decision,” arguing that only conscious decisions with a world-to-mind direction of fit qualify as genuine decisions. The objects of decisions, as this paper defends, are ideas, not actions. More precisely, the function of a decision is to narrow down a set of epistemically possible ideas leading to the action. Introducing a two-dimensional classification—contrasting cognitive processes with a world-to-mind and mind-to-world direction of fit, and conscious with unconscious cognitive processes—the paper examines various decision-like cognitive processes. It argues that unconscious cognitive processes and cognitive processes with a mind-to-world direction of fit lack essential features of decision-making, such as a direct causal connection with affective dispositions and control by the subject. This analysis defends a restrictive view of “decision” and argues that many decision-like processes that are commonly referred to as “decisions” do not have any philosophically or scientifically significant commonalities with conscious decisions with a world-to-mind direction of fit.

Keywords

• decision
• conceptual analysis
• conscious decisions
• unconscious decisions
• descriptive decisions
• normative decisions

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