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UNDERSTANDING IN THE PROBLEM OF LIMIT OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE

Year 2018, Volume: 5 Issue: 8, 206 - 218, 31.08.2018

Abstract

In the philosophy of Locke, problem of limit of knowledge is about how understanding is used. Understanding is the source of human knowledge. Understanding for knowledge operates as sensation and reflection. According to Locke, problem of limit of knowledge does not arise when the source of knowledge is experimenting understanding. Experiment provides understanding operating without exceeding its power, limit, and capacity. Human does not obtain knowledge but which is not knowledge when he attempts to know by understanding without experiment. Obtaining which is not knowledge means going beyond the limit of knowledge. That is why, in the philosophy of Locke, understanding as being the source of  nowledge determines the limit of knowledge. By making experiment the source of knowledge, understanding causes output of experiment to be excluded from knowledge. This is an effect of circumstance of using understanding in problem of the limit of knowledge. Consequently, understanding secures knowledge as being source of knowledge but at the same time limits it. This conclusion, obtained by using understanding in a philosophy in which experiment is assumed as the source of knowledge, is important.

References

  • Cohen, E. D., (1984), ‘Reason and Experience in Locke’s Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.45, No:1, 71-85, International Phenomenological Society
  • Cottingham, J., (1988). A History of Western Philosophy 4 The Rationalists, Oxford University Press.
  • Duschnisky, R. (2012), ‘Tabula Rasa and Human Nature’, Philosophy, vol.87, No:342, 509-529, Cambridge University Press
  • Gibson, James (1968). Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations, Cambridge at the University Press.
  • Locke, J., (2000). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Deneme, (Meral Delikara Topçu, çev.). Ankara: Öteki yayınevi.
  • Mackie, J. L. (1976). Problems From Locke, Oxford University Press.
  • O’connor, D. J. (1952). John Locke, Pelican Books.
  • Odegard, D., (1965), ‘Locke’s Epistemology and Value of Experience’, Journal of History of Ideas, Vol.26, No:3, 417-423, University of Pensylvania Press.
  • Odegard, D., (1993), ‘Locke and General Knowledge: A Reconstruction’, History of philosophy Quarterly, Vol 10, No:30, 225-239, University of Ilinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.
  • Woolhouse, R. S. (1984). Locke, University of Minnesota Press, Second Printing.
  • Yolton, W. John (1996). Locke and the Way of the İdeas, Thoemmes Press

JOHN LOCKE FELSEFESİNDE BİLGİNİN SINIRI PROBLEMİNDE ANLAMA YETİSİ

Year 2018, Volume: 5 Issue: 8, 206 - 218, 31.08.2018

Abstract

Locke felsefesinde bilginin sınırı problemi, anlama yetisinin nasıl kullanıldığı ile ilgilidir. İnsan bilgisinin kaynağı, anlama yetisidir. Anlama yetisi bilgide, dış ve iç deney şeklinde çalışır. Locke’a göre insan bilgisinin kaynağı, deney yapan anlama yetisi olduğu zaman bilginin sınırı problemi ortaya çıkmaz. Deney, anlama yetisinin güç, sınır ve kapasitesini aşmadan çalışmasını sağlar. İnsan, anlama yetisi ile deney yapamadan bilmeye kalkıştığında ise bilgi değil bilgi olmayanı elde eder. Bilgi olmayanın elde edilmesi bilginin sınırının geçilmesidir. Locke felsefesinde bu nedenle anlama yetisi, bilginin kaynağı olarak bilginin sınırını belirler. Anlama yetisi, bilginin kaynağının deney olmasını sağlarken deneyden gelenlerin bilginin dışında kalmasına neden olur. Bu, bilginin sınırı probleminde anlama yetisini kullanma koşulunun sonucudur. Böylece anlama yetisi, bilginin kaynağı olarak bilgiyi güvenceye alırken bilginin alanını sınırlar. Bilginin kaynağının deney olarak kabul edildiği bir felsefede, anlama yetisinin kullanılmasının neden olduğu bu sonuç önemlidir.

References

  • Cohen, E. D., (1984), ‘Reason and Experience in Locke’s Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.45, No:1, 71-85, International Phenomenological Society
  • Cottingham, J., (1988). A History of Western Philosophy 4 The Rationalists, Oxford University Press.
  • Duschnisky, R. (2012), ‘Tabula Rasa and Human Nature’, Philosophy, vol.87, No:342, 509-529, Cambridge University Press
  • Gibson, James (1968). Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations, Cambridge at the University Press.
  • Locke, J., (2000). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Deneme, (Meral Delikara Topçu, çev.). Ankara: Öteki yayınevi.
  • Mackie, J. L. (1976). Problems From Locke, Oxford University Press.
  • O’connor, D. J. (1952). John Locke, Pelican Books.
  • Odegard, D., (1965), ‘Locke’s Epistemology and Value of Experience’, Journal of History of Ideas, Vol.26, No:3, 417-423, University of Pensylvania Press.
  • Odegard, D., (1993), ‘Locke and General Knowledge: A Reconstruction’, History of philosophy Quarterly, Vol 10, No:30, 225-239, University of Ilinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.
  • Woolhouse, R. S. (1984). Locke, University of Minnesota Press, Second Printing.
  • Yolton, W. John (1996). Locke and the Way of the İdeas, Thoemmes Press
There are 11 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Naciye Atış This is me

Publication Date August 31, 2018
Published in Issue Year 2018 Volume: 5 Issue: 8

Cite

APA Atış, N. (2018). JOHN LOCKE FELSEFESİNDE BİLGİNİN SINIRI PROBLEMİNDE ANLAMA YETİSİ. Avrasya Sosyal Ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi, 5(8), 206-218.