Algorithmic Bipolarity: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Military Artificial Intelligence Competition between the United States and China

Abstract

This study considers artificial intelligence as a fundamental transformational dynamic that is restructuring the logic of production, organization of decision processes, and operational application of military capability in the international security environment. Advances in data processing, algorithmic analysis and real-time decision-making capabilities are leading to a redefinition of military effectiveness in terms of information superiority, system integration and decision speed. The study analyzes this transformation through the concept of algorithmic bipolarity. Algorithmic bipolarity refers to a distribution of power characterized by the concentration of data production, algorithmic innovation and computational capacity around two main techno-political centers, shaping the global artificial intelligence ecosystem in line with the institutional organizational logics of these centers. Structured within the framework of neoclassical realism, the analysis argues that systemically intensifying algorithmic competition drives great powers towards similar technological and military orientations, and that these pressures are processed through internal political and institutional structures in different models of capacity production. In this context, the study argues that convergence dynamics in the field of artificial intelligence produce common orientations, while divergence dynamics determine the institutional logic within which this capacity is produced. This process produces two distinct technopolitical models, conceptualized as Network-Based AI Governance in the case of the US and State-Centered AI Governance in the case of China. While the Network-Based model enables capacity generation within a distributed and multi-actor ecosystem, the State-Centric model offers an integrated structure based on centralized coordination and civil-military integration. Algorithmic bipolarity produces two distinct centers of gravity that influence the orientations of third states through these two technopolitical models. Technical standards, data governance practices, infrastructure architectures, hardware and infrastructure dependency, interoperability requirements and normative divergence produce frames of reference and channels of orientation for third states. These structural dynamics can shape third states’ defense planning, technology procurement choices, data governance models and digital infrastructure investments depending on their relationship with these prototypes. This study conceptualizes the role of artificial intelligence in international security through the relationship between the institutional structures that produce the capacity and the orientations that these structures generate.

Keywords

• Artificial Intelligence
• Algorithmic Bipolarity
• United States of America
• People’s Republic of China
• US-China Artificial Intelligence Competition

Algoritmik Bipolarite: Neoklasik Realizm Çerçevesinde ABD ve Çin Arasında Askerî Yapay Zekâ Rekabeti

Abstract

Bu çalışma, yapay zekâyı uluslararası güvenlik ortamında askerî kapasitenin üretim mantığını, karar süreçlerinin organizasyonunu ve operasyonel uygulama biçimlerini yeniden yapılandıran temel bir dönüşüm dinamiği olarak ele almaktadır. Veri işleme, algoritmik analiz ve gerçek zamanlı karar üretim kapasitesindeki ilerleme, askerî etkinliğin bilgi üstünlüğü, sistem entegrasyonu ve karar hızı ekseninde yeniden tanımlanmasına yol açmaktadır. Çalışma, bu dönüşümü algoritmik bipolarite kavramı üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Algoritmik bipolarite, veri üretimi, algoritmik inovasyon ve hesaplama kapasitesinin iki ana tekno-politik merkez etrafında yoğunlaşması küresel yapay zekâ ekosisteminin bu merkezlerin kurumsal örgütlenme mantıkları doğrultusunda şekillenmesiyle karakterize edilen bir güç dağılımını ifade etmektedir. Neoklasik realizm çerçevesinde yapılandırılan analiz, sistemik düzeyde yoğunlaşan algoritmik rekabetin büyük güçleri benzer teknolojik ve askerî yönelimlere sevk ettiğini, bu baskıların içsel siyasal ve kurumsal yapılar aracılığıyla farklı kapasite üretim modelleri içinde işlendiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, yapay zekâ alanındaki yakınsama dinamiklerinin ortak yönelimler ürettiğini, ayrışma dinamiklerinin ise bu kapasitenin hangi kurumsal mantık içinde üretileceğini belirlediğini savunmaktadır. Bu süreç, ABD örneğinde Ağ Temelli Yapay Zekâ Yönetişimi, Çin örneğinde ise Devlet Merkezli Yapay Zekâ Yönetişimi olarak kavramsallaştırılan iki ayrı teknopolitik model üretmektedir. Ağ Temelli model, dağıtık ve çok aktörlü bir ekosistem içinde kapasite üretimini mümkün kılarken, Devlet Merkezli model merkezî koordinasyon ve sivil-askerî entegrasyon temelinde bütünleşik bir yapı sunmaktadır. Algoritmik bipolarite, bu iki teknopolitik model üzerinden üçüncü devletlerin yönelimlerini etkileyen iki ayrı çekim merkezi üretmektedir. Teknik standartlar, veri yönetişimi pratikleri, altyapı mimarileri, donanım ve altyapı bağımlılığı, birlikte çalışabilirlik gereksinimleri ve normatif ayrışma, üçüncü devletler için referans çerçeveleri ve yönelim kanalları üretmektedir. Bu yapısal dinamikler, üçüncü devletlerin savunma planlamasını, teknoloji tedarik tercihlerini, veri yönetişimi modellerini ve dijital altyapı yatırımlarını söz konusu prototiplerle kurdukları ilişkilere bağlı olarak şekillendirebilmektedir. Bu çalışma, yapay zekânın uluslararası güvenlikteki rolünü, kapasitenin üretildiği kurumsal yapılar ile bu yapıların ortaya çıkardığı yönelimler arasındaki ilişki üzerinden kavramsallaştırmaktadır.

Keywords

• Yapay Zekâ
• Algoritmik Bipolarite
• Amerika Birleşik Devletleri
• Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti
• ABD-Çin Yapay Zekâ Rekabeti.

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