el-Ġazālī ve Descartes’ta Şüphecilik: Sami M. Najm’e Bir Cevap

Year 2024, , 583 - 597, 30.11.2024

Zeyneb Betül Taşkın

https://doi.org/10.33227/auifd.1258110

Abstract

Bu makalede Sami M. Najm’in Ebū Ḥāmid el-Ġazālī’nin (1058-1111) ve Descartes’ın şüpheci argümanlarının şu açılardan aynı olduğu iddiası tartışılmıştır: (1) Her iki filozo-fun şüphe süreçlerinin duyu ve akıl bilgisine olan güvensizlik üzerine temellendirilmele-ri, (2) kesinliğe varma konusundaki motivasyonları, (3) şüphelerinin hem metodik hem felsefî bir niteliğe sahip olduğu, (4) şüpheciliğe çözümleri. Ben burada Najm’in birinci ve ikinci iddiasının haklı olduğunu ancak üçüncü ve dördüncü iddasının doğru olmadığını savunuyorum. Üçüncü iddiasının doğru olmama sebebi, el-Ġazālī’nin şüpheciliğinin felsefî, Descartes’ın şüpheciliğinin ise yöntemsel olmasıdır. Dördüncü iddiasının doğru olmama sebebi ise iki filozofun çözümlerinin sezgi temelli olmasına rağmen sezgiden kasıtlarının farklı olmasıdır. el-Ġazālī’ye göre bu sezgi ilahî bir nitelik taşırken, Descar-tes’ta zihinsel bir karakter taşımaktadır. Descartes’ın bir teist olarak nihaî manada bu sezgiyi Tanrı’ya dayandırması, onun zihinsel bir karaktere sahip olduğu gerçeğini değiş-tirmemektedir.

Keywords

el-Ġazālī, Descartes, Şüphecilik, Yöntem Şüpheciliği, Felsefî Şüphecilik.

Skepticism in al-Ghazālī and Descartes: A Reply to Sami M. Najm

Abstract

This paper examines Sami M. Najm’s claim that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (1058-1111) and Descartes’ (1596-1650) skeptical arguments are similar in the following respect: (1) the process of doubt that depends on the distrust of sense perception and reason, (2) the motivation to arrive at certainty, (3) the nature of doubt being methodological and philosophical at the same time, and (4) their solution to doubt. I argue that while Najm’s first and second claim are to the point, Najm’s third and fourth points are not correct. This is because while al-Ghazālī’s skepticism was philosophical, Descartes’s doubt was methodological. It is true that their solution to doubt depends on intuition, but the character of their intuition is different because for al-Ghazālī it is a divine intuition whereas for Descartes it has a mental character. Although Descartes as a theist might ground the intuition on God, this does not change its mental character.

Keywords

al-Ghazālī, Descartes, Skepticism, Methodological Skepticism, Philosophical Skepticism.

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