Peer Disagreement and Personal Responsibility

Abstract

If you encounter a disagreement, what makes you think you are the right party? You may think you know better. What if your opponent is someone you considered epistemically equal to yourself? Someone who is your peer. Peer disagreement, as a relatively recent topic in epistemology, has attracted increasing attention. Thus, there are some gaps in the field. In this research, I aim to address one aspect of it, which is the individuality of epistemic responsibility. In the first part, key concepts of the discussion and various attitudes derived from the systematization of these concepts, such as peerness standards, rationality, permissiveness, uniqueness thesis, and principle of independence will be examined and then the new position will be introduced. A number of positions have been developed through different systematizations of these concepts. In the second part of the article, those different approaches; steadfast view, conciliatory view, justificationist view, equal weight view and total evidence view of peer disagreement with pros and cons in solution and explanatory power will be explained. After setting the tone of the discussion, the justification of why personal responsibility matters and what is special to it will be discussed. Briefly, the responsibility view provides a steadfast position while not rejecting the principle of independence and uniqueness thesis and, by not breaking the ideal peer disagreement. Finally, the application of this position will be demonstrated on religious and non-religious beliefs, and it will be shown that even in an ideal peer disagreement on religious beliefs, individuals can keep their position.

Keywords

• Philosophy of Religion
• Epistemology of Disagreement
• Peer Disagreement
• Steadfastness
• Conciliationism.

Denk İhtilafı ve Bireysel Sorumluluk

Abstract

Bir ihtilafla karşılaştığınızda size haklı taraf olduğunuz düşündürten şey nedir? Elbette doğru bildiğinizi düşünebilirsiniz fakat ihtilaf ettiğiniz kişiyi epistemik olarak kendinize denk görüyorsanız durum ne olur? Kendinize denk olarak kabul ettikten sonra, karşınızdaki kişiyi görmezden gelmek için gerçekten bir gerekçeye sahip misiniz? İhtilaf epistemolojisi, görece yeni bir tartışma alanı olarak gelişmektedir. Bu sebeple, hala bazı boşluklara sahiptir. Makalede, epistemik sorumluluğun bireyselliğini açıklayarak bu boşluklardan birini dolduruyorum. Makalenin birinci bölümünde, epistemik denklik standartları, rasyonalite, müsamahacalık, eşsizlik tezi, bağımsızlık tezi gibi anahtar kavramların analizi ve kendi pozisyonumun çekirdeği yer alacaktır. Sonrasında ise bu kavramların farklı kullanımlarından ortaya çıkan; fikir değiştirmemeyi savunan kararlılık görüşü, fikir değiştirmeyi savunan uzlaşımcı görüş, eşit ağırlık görüşü, gerekçelendirmeci görüş ve toplam delil görüşü olarak isimlendirilen pozisyonlar güçlü ve zayıf yönleriyle değerlendirilecektir. Tartışmanın zemini hazırlandıktan sonra bireysel sorumluluğun neden önemli olduğu tartışılacaktır. İleri sürülen sorumlulukçu yaklaşım, kararlılık görüşünün bir versiyonu olmakla birlikte bağımsızlık prensibini ve eşsizlik tezini reddetmemektedir ve dolayısıyla kararlılık görüşünü savunmak için denkliği ortadan kaldırmamaktadır. Son olarak makalede, ileri sürülen sorumlulukçu yaklaşım dinî denk ihtilafına uygulanacaktır ve dinî ihtilafta taraflar epistemik olarak birbirine ideal anlamda denk dahi olsa sorumluluğun bireyselliğinden hareketle tarafların inançlarında sabit kalmasının gerekçelendirilebileceği savunulacaktır.

Keywords

• Uzlaşımcılık.
• Din Felsefesi
• İhtilaf Epistemolojisi
• Denk İhtilafı
• Kararlılıkçılık

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