Hegemonic Party’s Role in Cooptation of Opposition: The Case Of United Russia Party

Year 2022, Volume: 22 Issue: 2, 14 - 25, 04.11.2022

Mustafa Cem Oğuz

https://doi.org/10.25294/auiibfd.1069193

Abstract

In electoral authoritarian regimes, the cooptation of the opposition is one of the most frequently used management techniques. The cooptation can be carried out not only through the personal relations of the autocrat, but also through the institution of the political party. The act of cooptation through a political party results in that party becoming a hegemonic party in national and subnational politics. In this study, we will consider United Russia, one of the most influential Hegemonic Parties of our time, and examine the electoral authoritarian regime established by Putin through it. The study will examine how United Russia became a "party of power", how it continued its cooptation strategy, and how it became a hegemonic party at the end of this process. The thesis of our study is that Putin made the United Russia a "party of power" with legal restrictions and coercion, thus laying the groundwork for the cooptation activity. Meanwhile, United Russia has provided regional elites with spoils and opportunities to access politics, thereby enabling them to become party members. As a result, within a period of 10 years, the overwhelming majority of the political elites were cooptated directly and indirectly, and the party turned into a hegemonic party. Thanks to United Russia, Putin also reduced the costs of administration, controlled the intra-party schisms, and neutralized the political elites that would lead the social opposition.

Keywords

Cooptation, Hegemonic Party, United Russia, Putin, Electoral Authoritarianism.

Muhalefetin Devşirilmesinde Hegemonik Parti’nin Rolü: Birleşik Rusya Partisi Örneği

Abstract

Seçimli Otoriter rejimlerde, muhalefetin devşirilmesi en sık başvurulan yönetme tekniklerinden biridir. Devşirme faaliyeti salt otokratın kişisel ilişkileri üzerinden olabileceği gibi siyasal parti kurumu üzerinden de gerçekleşebilmektedir. Siyasal parti üzerinden gerçekleşen devşirme faaliyeti o partinin ulusal ve ulusaltı siyasette Hegemonik bir parti haline gelmesiyle sonuçlanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada günümüzün en etkili Hegemonik Partilerinden biri olan Birleşik Rusya ele alınacak ve onun aracılığıyla Putin’in kurmuş olduğu seçimli otoriter rejim incelenecektir. Çalışma Birleşik Rusya’nın nasıl “iktidar partisi” haline geldiğini, devşirme stratejisini nasıl sürdürdüğünü ve de bu süreç sonunda nasıl hegemonik bir parti konumuna eriştiğini irdeleyecektir. Çalışmamızın iddiası o dur ki, Putin yasal sınırlamalar ve zorlamalar ile Birleşik Rusya’yı “iktidar partisi” haline getirmiş ve böylece devşirme faaliyeti için zemini hazırlamıştır. Birleşik Rusya da bölgesel elitlere kaynak ve siyasaya erişme fırsatları sunarak onların parti üyesi olmasını sağlamıştır. Neticede 10 yıllık süreç içinde siyasal elitlerin kahir ekseriyeti doğrudan ve dolaylı yollarla devşirilmiş ve parti, hegemonik bir partiye dönüşmüştür. Putin de Birleşik Rusya sayesinde yönetme maliyetlerini düşürmüş, parti içi hizipleşmeleri kontrol altına almış ve toplumsal muhalefete önderlik edecek siyasi elitleri etkisizleştirmiştir.

Keywords

Devşirme, Hegemonik Parti, Birleşik Rusya, Putin, Seçimli Otoriterlik.

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