Development of the Concept of Civilian Control from 17th Century Till Today

Abstract

This article aims to introduce a conceptual framework concerning the development of civilian control. Civilian control, a concept of modern liberal state, denotes a particular circumstance under which military’s authority is constrained in favor of civilians, both holding military accountable to the civilian authorities and enhancing civilians’ decisive role in public decision making bodies. The origin of civilian control can be traced back to the 17th century’s Social Contract theorists. The concept of civilian control, which began to be used in the 19th century, developed as a concept with its political, economical and social aspects. Civilian control began to be handled within the framework of a descriptive and normative method in the second half of 20th century. In this period, the professionalisation approach, which aimed to transform military into an apolitical apparatus, dominated civilian control literature. Since the late 20th century, an approach has emerged that has intended to provide civilian control by non-state actors beside public bodies and by management techniques. In this context, this article endeavors to demonstrate that the concept of civilian control has developed as a multidimensional concept and that the practice of civilian control has been moved beyond the boundaries of state apparatus since the late 20th century.

Keywords

• Civilian control
• military
• Military Keynesianism
• Concordance Approach
• Agency Approach

Sivil Kontrol Kavramının 17'nci Yüzyıldan Günümüze Gelişimi

Abstract

Bu makale, sivil kontrolün gelişimine ilişkin bir kavramsal çerçeve ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Modern liberal devletin bir kavramı olan sivil kontrol, ordunun otoritesinin siviller lehine sınırlandığı, ordunun sivillere karşı sorumlu olduğu ve kamusal karar alma mekanizmalarında sivillerin belirleyici rolünün güçlendirildiği belirli bir durumu ifade etmektedir. Sivil kontrolün kökeni 17’nci yüzyıl Toplumsal Sözleşme kuramcılarının tartışmalarına kadar geri götürülebilir. 19’uncu yüzyıldan itibaren kullanılmaya başlayan sivil kontrol kavramı, siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal yönleri olan bir kavram olarak gelişmiştir. Sivil kontrol, 20’nci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren betimleyici ve kural koyucu bir yöntem çerçevesinde ele alınmaya başlamıştır. 20’nci yüzyılın ikinci yarısında, sivil kontrol alanyazınına, orduyu apolitik bir aygıta dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan profesyonelleşme yaklaşımı hâkim olmuştur. 20’nci yüzyılın sonundan itibaren ise, sivil kontrolün kamusal mekanizmalar yanında devlet dışı aktörler tarafından ve işletmecilik teknikleriyle sağlanmasına yönelik bir yaklaşım ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu kapsamda, makale, sivil kontrol kavramının çok boyutlu olarak gelişim gösterdiğini ve sivil kontrol pratiğinin 20’nci yüzyılın sonundan itibaren devlet aygıtının sınırlarının dışına taşındığını göstermeye çalışmaktadır.

Keywords

• Sivil kontrol
• Ordu
• Askeri Keynesçilik
• Uyumluluk Yaklaşımı
• Vekâlet Yaklaşımı.

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