Kamu Malları: Piyasa Başarısızlığı mı Teorilerin Başarısızlığı mı?

Year 2013, , 147 - 184, 01.04.2013

Meltem Kayıran

https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000002299

Abstract

Kamu malları genellikle bir piyasa başarısızlığı olarak ortaya konulan ve bu nedenle devlet müdahalesini gerektiren bir konu olarak görülmektedir. Fakat anaakım kamu malları teorileri derinlemesine incelendiğinde kamu mallarının devlet sunumuna gerekçe oluşturacak özellikleri konusunda bir uzlaşma olmadığı ve genellikle kamusal sunumun onaylanmadığı görülmektedir. Çalışmanın temel tezi, kamu malı kavramının malların kamusallığını açıklamada yetersiz olduğu ve kamu malı teorilerinin açıklamayı amaçladığı konularda bile yeterli bir açıklama getiremediğidir. Bu tezi araştırmak üzere, malların kamusallığı, kamu mallarının optimum üretim düzeyi, piyasa dışı karar alma süreçleri ve piyasa başarısızlıkları konularında kamu malları teorisinin yeterli açıklama getirip getirmediği incelenmektedir. Kamu malları konusunda katkıda bulunmuş olan farklı iktisat okullarının -geleneksel neoklasik iktisat, kamu tercihi okulu ve yeni kurumsalcı iktisadın- bu konulardaki yaklaşımları karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde ele alınmakta, son olarak da teorilerin ortaklaştığı temeller üzerinden eleştirel bir değerlendirme yapılmaktadır.

Keywords

Kamu malları kavramı, bedavacılık, gönüllü katkı, piyasa başarısızlığı, kolektif karar alma

Public Goods: Market Failure or the Failure of the Theories?

Abstract

Public goods are generally perceived as market failure and consequently are thought to be subject to public intervention. However, when mainstream theories are closely examined, one can see that there is no consensus on the characteristics of public goods that would justify public provision, hence there are many objections to the public provision of such goods. The main thesis of this study is that the concept of public goods is inadequate to describe the publicness of goods, and corresponding theories also fail to clearly explain even what they themselves theoretically devised. To investigate this thesis, it is examined whether public goods theory has a satisfactory explanation about publicness of goods as well as optimal provision, collective decision making processes and market failure. These are comparatively studied by the views of main economic schools of thought that contribute to the theory of public goods - traditional neoclassical economics, public choice school and new institutionalist economics. Finally, the basis common to all these theories are critically evaluated.

Keywords

Public goods concept, free riding, voluntary contribution, market failure, collective decision making

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