Elektrik Üretiminde Serbestleştirmenin Sorunları: Piyasa Gücü ve Uluslararasılaşma

Abstract

Keywords

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ELEKTRİK ÜRETİMİNDE SERBESTLEŞTİRMENİN SORUNLARI: PİYASA GÜCÜ VE ULUSLARARASILAŞMA

Abstract

Serbestleştirme süreci elektrik sektörüne de sirayet etmektedir. Elektrik sektörü serbestleştirmesi, ona teorik altyapıyı hazırlayan yazınla birlikte gelişmektedir. Ancak bu süreçte teorik yazının öngöremediği problemler karşılaşılmaktadır. Bu sorunlardan en önemlisi hiç kuşkusuz serbestleştirilen elektik üretimi piyasalarında ortaya çıkan piyasa gücü sorundur. Serbestleştirme yazınının teorik kanadı bu sorunun çözümü için ciddi bir çaba içindedir ancak bu yazının ampirik kanadının sunduğu kanıtlar elektrik üretimi ve dağıtımı piyasalarında piyasa gücü sorununun boyutlarının giderek büyüdüğünü göstermektedir. Serbestleştirilen elektrik sektörlerinin uluslar arasılaşması da sürece yeni dinamikler katmaktadır. Bu yazı piyasa gücü sorununun teorik ve ampirik anlamda ne ölçüde ciddi bir sorun olduğunu tartışmayı ve çok uluslulaşmanın boyutlarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Keywords

• Elektrik üretim sektörü, serbestleştirme, yoğunlaşma, piyasa gücü, uluslararasılaşma

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