Eşleşme Teorisi ve Piyasa Tasarımı

Year 2014, Volume: 69 Issue: 02, 379 - 405, 01.02.2014

M. Kadir Doğan

https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000002316

Abstract

Eşleşme teorisi, bölünmez kaynakların dağıtımını, değişimini ve birbirleriyle eşleşmesini inceleyen, oyun teorisi ve mekanizma tasarımı araçlarını kullanan ve mikroiktisatın son otuz yılda hızla gelişen bir alanıdır. 2012 yılında, Nobel ekonomi ödülü, eşleşme teorisi ve piyasa tasarımı alanındaki katkılarından dolayı iki iktisatçıya, Alvin E. Roth ve Lloyd S. Shapley’e verilmiştir. Bu ödül, eşleşme teorisinin ve piyasa tasarımının önemini bir kez daha vurgulamıştır. Öte yandan Türkiye’de eşleşme teorisi alanı pek bilinmemektedir. Bu makalenin amacı, eşleşme teorisi ve piyasa tasarımı konusunda literatürdeki bazı önemli modelleri ve sonuçları anlatarak bu alanın tanınmasına katkı sağlamaktır. Bu amaçla çalışmada, iki taraflı ve tek taraflı eşleşme piyasaları, okul seçimi problemi, üniversitelere öğrenci yerleştirme problemi ve böbrek değişimi için piyasa tasarımı incelenmektedir.

Keywords

Eşleşme, piyasa tasarımı, okul seçimi, öğrenci yerleşimi, böbrek değişimi

Matching Theory and Market Design

Abstract

During the past 30 years, matching theory has become a rapidly growing branch of microeconomics that analyzes the allocation, exchange and matching of indivisible resources while using the tools of game theory and mechanism design. The 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to two economists, Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley, for their contributions to matching theory and market design, highlighting the importance of these paradigms. On the other hand, the field of matching theory is not known well in Turkey. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the recognition of matching theory and market design by introducing some of the fundamental models and results in this field. Therefore, two-sided and one-sided matching markets, school choice problem, student placement problem and market design for kidney exchange are examined in this study.

Keywords

Matching, market design, school choice, student placement, kidney exchange

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