Abstract
Keywords
References
- CYERT, R.M / KANG, S-H. / KUMAR, P. (2002), "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top. Management Compensation: Theory and Evidenee," Management Science, 48/4: 453- 469.
- DAHYA, J.B. / MCCONNELL, J.J. (2005), "Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions," Journalaf Corporate Finance, 11(1 /2): 37.60.
- GANDOLFO, G. (1996), Economic Dynamics (Berlin: Heidelberg; New York: Springer).
- GARDNER, R. / MORRIS, M. (1991), "The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games," SELTEN, R. (Der.), Game Equilibrium Models i: Evolution and Game Dynamics (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag): 182-194.
- HERMALlN, B.E. / WEISBACK, M.S. (2003), "Board of Directors as an Endogeneously Determined Institution: A Survey of Economic Literature," University of California, Berkeley Working Paper Series (FRBNY Economic Policy Review).
- HU, X. / SHAPLEY, L.S. (2003), "'On Authority Distributions in Organizations: Controls," Games and Economic Behavior, 45: 153-170.
- MASON, C.F. / GOnESMAN, A.A. / PREVOST, A.K. (2003), "Shareholder Intervention, Manageriat Resistance, and Corporate Control: A Nash Equilibrium Approach," The Quorterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43: 466-482.
- NOE, T.H. / PI, L. (2000), "Learning Dynamics, Genetic Algorithms, and Corporate Takeovers," Journalaf Economic Dynamics and Control, 24: 189-217.
- SAMUELSON, L. (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press).
- SCHLAG, K. H. (1997), "Why Imitate. and if so, How? A Bounded Rationality Approach to Multiarmed Bandits," Journalaf Economic Theory, 78: 127-159.
- SELTEN, R. (1980), "A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts," Journal of Theoretical Biology. 84: 93-101.
- SOYTAŞ, U. (2002), "EvrimselOyun Teorisi Üzerine Bir Not," Abant Izzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 5: 198.206.
- SOYTAŞ, U. / BECKER, K.G. (2003), "Is Limit Pricing Evolutionarily Stable?," Journal of Evolutionary Eeonomies, 13/3: 281-288.
- SOYTAŞ, U. (2005), "The Role of Fixed Costs in an Evolutionary Entry Game with Bertrand Players," Hacettepe /lBF Dergisi, 23/2: 207-219.
- TAYLOR, P. / JONKER, L. (1978), "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Mathematieal Bioseienees, 40: 145-156.
Abstract
Yatırımcı ve hedef yönetim arasındaki kurumsal kontrol etkileşimini modellemek için oyun teorisi uygun bir araçtır. Ancak geleneksel oyun teorisi araçları genelde birden fazla Nash dengesini işaret etmektedir. Bu makalede Mason ve diğerlerinde (2003) yer alan asimetrik bilgili etap oyunu, evrimsel ve dinamik bir kurumsal kontrol oyunu olarak modellenmiştir. Geniş denge kümeleri yerine, evrimsel oyunun çözümünde olası kararlı durum olabilecek sekiz vaka bulunmuştur. Yakalardaki seçimlerin evrimsel kararlı stratejiler olabilmeleri için gerekli olan kazanç yapılan ortaya konmuştur. Böylece popülasyondaki yatırımcı tipi olasılık dağılımı tahmin edildiğinde, oyunun tek kararlı durumunu bulmak mümkün olmaktadır. Bu denge oyuncuların rasyonel olduğu varsayımına dayanmamaktadır.
Keywords
Kurumsal kontrol evrimsel kararlı stratejiler oyun teorisi asimetrik bilgili etap oyunu Mason
References
- CYERT, R.M / KANG, S-H. / KUMAR, P. (2002), "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top. Management Compensation: Theory and Evidenee," Management Science, 48/4: 453- 469.
- DAHYA, J.B. / MCCONNELL, J.J. (2005), "Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions," Journalaf Corporate Finance, 11(1 /2): 37.60.
- GANDOLFO, G. (1996), Economic Dynamics (Berlin: Heidelberg; New York: Springer).
- GARDNER, R. / MORRIS, M. (1991), "The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games," SELTEN, R. (Der.), Game Equilibrium Models i: Evolution and Game Dynamics (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag): 182-194.
- HERMALlN, B.E. / WEISBACK, M.S. (2003), "Board of Directors as an Endogeneously Determined Institution: A Survey of Economic Literature," University of California, Berkeley Working Paper Series (FRBNY Economic Policy Review).
- HU, X. / SHAPLEY, L.S. (2003), "'On Authority Distributions in Organizations: Controls," Games and Economic Behavior, 45: 153-170.
- MASON, C.F. / GOnESMAN, A.A. / PREVOST, A.K. (2003), "Shareholder Intervention, Manageriat Resistance, and Corporate Control: A Nash Equilibrium Approach," The Quorterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43: 466-482.
- NOE, T.H. / PI, L. (2000), "Learning Dynamics, Genetic Algorithms, and Corporate Takeovers," Journalaf Economic Dynamics and Control, 24: 189-217.
- SAMUELSON, L. (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press).
- SCHLAG, K. H. (1997), "Why Imitate. and if so, How? A Bounded Rationality Approach to Multiarmed Bandits," Journalaf Economic Theory, 78: 127-159.
- SELTEN, R. (1980), "A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts," Journal of Theoretical Biology. 84: 93-101.
- SOYTAŞ, U. (2002), "EvrimselOyun Teorisi Üzerine Bir Not," Abant Izzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 5: 198.206.
- SOYTAŞ, U. / BECKER, K.G. (2003), "Is Limit Pricing Evolutionarily Stable?," Journal of Evolutionary Eeonomies, 13/3: 281-288.
- SOYTAŞ, U. (2005), "The Role of Fixed Costs in an Evolutionary Entry Game with Bertrand Players," Hacettepe /lBF Dergisi, 23/2: 207-219.
- TAYLOR, P. / JONKER, L. (1978), "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Mathematieal Bioseienees, 40: 145-156.
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Journal Section | Research Articles |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | February 1, 2007 |
| Submission Date | July 31, 2014 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2007 Volume: 62 Issue: 02 |