Yeni Kurumsal İktisat

Year 2024, , 1011 - 1048, 31.10.2024

Muhammet Buğra Sucu

https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1473087

Abstract

Yeni Kurumsal İktisat; sosyal, politik ve iktisadi kurumları anlamak için iktisat, hukuk, organizasyon teorisi, siyaset bilimi ve sosyoloji alanlarını birleştirerek hızla büyüyen bir literatüre sahiptir. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat; kurumların ne olduğunu, nasıl ortaya çıktığını, hangi amaçlara hizmet ettiğini, nasıl değiştiğini, nasıl reforme edilebileceğini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Ronald Coase, Douglas North ve Olivier Williamson'un öncü çalışmaları sayesinde kurumların artık endüstriler, ülkeler ve bölgeler arasındaki performans farklılıklarını açıklamada önemli bir faktör olduğu kabul edilmektedir. İktisat alanında önemli bir akım haline gelen kurumsal analiz; organizasyon teorisi, mülkiyet hakları, sözleşme teorisi, vekalet teorisi ve yönetişim yapılarını inceleyerek ekonomik büyüme/kalkınma gibi alanlarda uygulamalı çalışmalara ve politik analizlere yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmada Yeni Kurumsal İktisat Okulu’nun temel çerçevesi incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı kurumların iktisadi performansa olan etkilerine ilişkin tahminde bulunabilmek için gereken iktisadi mantığa dair başlıca konuları ele almaktır.

Keywords

Kurumsal Analiz, Organizasyon Teorisi, Sözleşme Teorisi, Vekalet Teorisi, Mülkiyet Hakları

New Institutional Economics

Abstract

New Institutional Economics is a rapidly growing field that integrates economics, law, organization theory, political science, and sociology to understand social, political, and economic institutions. NIE seeks to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they serve, how they change, and how they can be reformed. Pioneering work by Ronald Coase, Douglas North, and Olivier Williamson has led to the recognition that institutions are now considered a significant factor in explaining performance differences between industries, countries, and regions. Institutional analysis, which has become a significant school of thought in economics, has led to applied work and policy analysis in areas such as economic growth and development by examining organizational theory, property rights, contract theory, agency theory, and governance structures. This study examines the fundamental framework of the New Institutional Economics School. The aim of this study is to address the main economic logic required to make predictions about the impact of institutions on economic performance.

Keywords

Institutional Analysis, Organization Theory, Contract Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, Property Rights

References

• Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
• Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review, 53, 941–973.
• Arrow, K. J. (1969). The Organization of Economic Activity : Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation. Washington DC: Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 1–16. https://econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/ArrowNonMktActivity1969.pdf
• Berle, A. A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. Macmillan.
• Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010). Property Rights and Economic Development* (pp. 4525–4595). https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9
• Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E., Schillemans, T., & Gailmard, S. (2014). Accountability and Principal–Agent Theory. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0016
• Buchanan, J. M. (1964). What Should Economists Do? Southern Economic Journal, 30(3), 213. https://doi.org/10.2307/1055931
• Buchanan, J. M. (1975). A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory. The American Economic Review, 65(2), 225–230. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1818857
• Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The Constitution of Economic Policy. The American Economic Review, 77(3), 243–250.
• Buchanan, J. M. (1988). Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation. The American Economic Review, 78(2), 135–139. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1818111
• Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
• Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
• Coase, R. H. (1992). The Institutional Structure of Production. American Economic Review, 82, 713–719.
• D’Andrade, R. (1986). Three Scientific World Views and the Covering Law Model. In R. Shweder & D. Fiske (Eds.), Metatheory in Social Science (pp. 19–41). University of Chicago Press.
• Davis, L. E., & North, D. C. (1971). Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511561078
• Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–359.
• Demski, J. S., & Felthaml, G. A. (1978). Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems. The Accounting Review, 53(2), 336–359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/245898
• Drobak, J. N., & Nye, J. V. C. (1997). The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. San Diego, Harcourt Brace.
• Eggertson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
• Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57. https://doi.org/10.2307/258191
• Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837292
• Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1991). The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment, College Station (TX). Texas A&M Press.
• Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1997). Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
• Groenewegen, J., Kerstholt, F., & Nagelkerke, A. (1995). On Integrating New and Old Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges. Journal of Economic Issues, 29(2), 467–475. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1995.11505684
• Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979). Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(2), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
• Hayek, F. A. (1937). Economics and Knowledge. Economica, 4(13), 33–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/2548786
• Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. In Individualism and Economic Order (pp. 77–91). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Holmes, O. W. (1881). The Common Law. (Tekrar Basım, Boston: Little Brown, 1946).
• Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91.
• Jensen, M. C. (1983). Organization Theory and Methodology. The Accounting Review, 58(2), 319–339. https://www.jstor.org/stable/246838
• Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
• Kılıçoğlu, A. M. (2018). Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümleri (22. Baskı). Turhan Kitabevi.
• Klein, P. G. (1998). New Institutional Economics. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.115811
• Leff, A. A. (1970). Contract as Thing. The American University Law Rewview, 19(2), 131–157.
• Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72, 854–906.
• Makowski, L., & Ostroy, J. M. (2001). Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 479–535. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.479
• Matthews, R. C. O. (1986). The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth. The Economic Journal, 96(384), 903. https://doi.org/10.2307/2233164
• Ménard, C. (2018). Research frontiers of new institutional economics. RAUSP Management Journal, 53(1), 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RAUSPM.2017.12.002
• North, D. C. (1986). The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 142(1), 230–237. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40726723
• North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.97
• North, D. C. (2010). Kurumlar, Kurumsal Değişim ve Ekonomik Performans (2. basım). (Çev. G. Ç. Güven). Sabancı Üniversitesi. (Eserin Orijinali 1999’da yayımlandı).
• Obińska-Wajda, E. (2016). The New Institutional Economics-Main Theories. E-Finanse, 12(1), 78–85. https://doi.org/10.1515/fiqf-2016-0138
• Organisation Economic Co-operation and Development [OEC Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795.
• Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, 53(5), 941–973.
• Arrow, K. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-market allocation. Joint Economic Committee of Congress. https://econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/ArrowNonMktActivity1969.pdf
• Berle, A. A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. Macmillan.
• Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010). Property rights and economic development. In Handbook of Development Economics (Vol. 5, pp. 4525–4595). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9
• Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E., Schillemans, T., & Gailmard, S. (2014). Accountability and principal–agent theory. In M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, & T. Schillemans (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public accountability. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0016
• Buchanan, J. M. (1964). What should economists do? Southern Economic Journal, 30(3), 213. https://doi.org/10.2307/1055931
• Buchanan, J. M. (1975). A contractarian paradigm for applying economic theory. American Economic Review, 65(2), 225–230. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1818857
• Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The constitution of economic policy. American Economic Review, 77(3), 243–250.
• Buchanan, J. M. (1988). Contractarian political economy and constitutional interpretation. American Economic Review, 78(2), 135–139. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1818111
• Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the American industrial enterprise. MIT Press.
• Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
• Coase, R. H. (1992). The institutional structure of production. American Economic Review, 82(4), 713–719.
• D’Andrade, R. (1986). Three scientific world views and the covering law model. In R. A. Shweder & D. W. Fiske (Eds.), Metatheory in social science: Pluralisms and subjectivities (pp. 19–41). University of Chicago Press.
• Davis, L. E., & North, D. C. (1971). Institutional change and American economic growth. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511561078
• Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–359.
• Demski, J. S., & Feltham, G. A. (1978). Economic incentives in budgetary control systems. The Accounting Review, 53(2), 336–359. https://www.jstor.org/stable/245898
• Drobak, J. N., & Nye, J. V. C. (1997). The frontiers of the new institutional economics. Harcourt Brace.
• Eggertsson, T. (1990). Economic behavior and institutions. Cambridge University Press.
• Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/258191
• Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837292
• Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1991). The new institutional economics: An assessment. Texas A&M Press.
• Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1997). Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics. University of Michigan Press.
• Groenewegen, J., Kerstholt, F., & Nagelkerke, A. (1995). On integrating new and old institutionalism: Douglass North building bridges. Journal of Economic Issues, 29(2), 467–475. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1995.11505684
• Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979). Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(2), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
• Hayek, F. A. (1937). Economics and knowledge. Economica, 4(13), 33–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/2548786
• Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. In Individualism and economic order (pp. 77–91). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Holmes, O. W. (1881). The common law. Little Brown.
• Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74–91.
• Jensen, M. C. (1983). Organization theory and methodology. The Accounting Review, 58(2), 319–339. https://www.jstor.org/stable/246838
• Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
• Kılıçoğlu, A. M. (2018). Borçlar hukuku genel hükümleri (22. baskı). Turhan Kitabevi.
• Klein, P. G. (1998). New institutional economics. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.115811
• Leff, A. A. (1970). Contract as thing. The American University Law Review, 19(2), 131–157.
• Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72(6), 854–906.
• Makowski, L., & Ostroy, J. M. (2001). Perfect competition and the creativity of the market. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 479–535. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.479
• Matthews, R. C. O. (1986). The economics of institutions and the sources of growth. The Economic Journal, 96(384), 903–918. https://doi.org/10.2307/2233164
• Ménard, C. (2018). Research frontiers of new institutional economics. RAUSP Management Journal, 53(1), 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RAUSPM.2017.12.002
• North, D. C. (1986). The new institutional economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 142(1), 230–237. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40726723
• North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.97
• North, D. C. (2010). Kurumlar, kurumsal değişim ve ekonomik performans (2. basım, G. Ç. Güven, Çev.). Sabancı Üniversitesi.
• Obińska-Wajda, E. (2016). The new institutional economics-main theories. E-Finanse, 12(1), 78–85. https://doi.org/10.1515/fiqf-2016-0138
• Organisation Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. (1993). Glossary of industrial organisation economics and competition law. https://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf
• Parada, J. J. (2002). Original institutional economics and new institutional economics: Revisiting the bridges (or the divide). Oeconomicus, 6(1), 43–61.
• D. (1993). Glossary of industrial organisation economics and competition law. https://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf
• Parada, J. J. (2002). Original institutional economics and new institutional economics: Revisiting the bridges (or the divide). Oeconomicus, VI, 43–61.
• Pejovich, S. (1995). Economic analysis of institutions and systems. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Posner, R. A. (2014). Economic analysis of law (9th ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
• Randall, A. (1987). Resource economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
• Richter, R. (2015). Essays on new institutional economics. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14154-1
• Robbins, L. (1932). An essay on the nature and significance of economic science. New York: New York University Press.
• Rutherford, M. (1995). The old and the new institutionalism: Can bridges be built? Journal of Economic Issues, 29(2), 443–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1995.11505681
• Samuels, W. J., & Schmid, A. A. (Eds.). (1980). Law and economics. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8766-1
• Segal, I., & Whinston, M. D. (2013). Property rights. In R. Gibbons & J. Roberts (Eds.), The handbook of organizational economics (pp. 100–158). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-005
• Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 55. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319
• Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York: Macmillan.
• Simon, H. A. (1962). The architecture of complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106(6), 467–482. https://www.jstor.org/stable/985254
• Simon, H. A. (1991). Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.2.25
• Sykuta, M. E., & Cook, M. L. (2001). A new institutional economics approach to contracts and cooperatives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(5), 1273–1279. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1244819
• Tietenberg, T. H. (1992). Environmental and natural resource economics. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
• Watkins, T. (2023). The transaction cost approach to the theory of the firm. San José State University Economics Department. https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/coase.htm
• Werin, L., & Wijkander, H. (Eds.). (1992). Contract economics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
• Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
• Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. The Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233–261. https://doi.org/10.1086/466942
• Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
• Williamson, O. E. (1990). A comparison of alternative approaches to economic organization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 146(1), 61–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751303
• Williamson, O. E. (2002). The theory of the firm as governance structure: From choice to contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 171–195. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002760278776