Yeni Kurumsal İktisat

Muhammet Buğra Sucu

doi:10.25229/beta.1473087

EN TR

Yeni Kurumsal İktisat

Abstract

Yeni Kurumsal İktisat; sosyal, politik ve iktisadi kurumları anlamak için iktisat, hukuk, organizasyon teorisi, siyaset bilimi ve sosyoloji alanlarını birleştirerek hızla büyüyen bir literatüre sahiptir. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat; kurumların ne olduğunu, nasıl ortaya çıktığını, hangi amaçlara hizmet ettiğini, nasıl değiştiğini, nasıl reforme edilebileceğini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Ronald Coase, Douglas North ve Olivier Williamson'un öncü çalışmaları sayesinde kurumların artık endüstriler, ülkeler ve bölgeler arasındaki performans farklılıklarını açıklamada önemli bir faktör olduğu kabul edilmektedir. İktisat alanında önemli bir akım haline gelen kurumsal analiz; organizasyon teorisi, mülkiyet hakları, sözleşme teorisi, vekalet teorisi ve yönetişim yapılarını inceleyerek ekonomik büyüme/kalkınma gibi alanlarda uygulamalı çalışmalara ve politik analizlere yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmada Yeni Kurumsal İktisat Okulu’nun temel çerçevesi incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı kurumların iktisadi performansa olan etkilerine ilişkin tahminde bulunabilmek için gereken iktisadi mantığa dair başlıca konuları ele almaktır.

Keywords

Kurumsal Analiz, Organizasyon Teorisi, Sözleşme Teorisi, Vekalet Teorisi, Mülkiyet Hakları

References

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Details

Primary Language

Turkish

Subjects

Institutional Economics

Journal Section

Research Article

Authors

Muhammet Buğra Sucu ^*
0009-0004-0780-1625
Türkiye

Early Pub Date

October 22, 2024

Publication Date

October 31, 2024

Submission Date

April 24, 2024

Acceptance Date

September 4, 2024

Published in Issue

Year 2024 Volume: 9 Number: 3

DOI

https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1473087

IZ

https://izlik.org/JA56WF25JG

APA

Sucu, M. B. (2024). Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis, 9(3), 1011-1048. https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1473087

AMA

1.Sucu MB. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Beta. 2024;9(3):1011-1048. doi:10.25229/beta.1473087

Chicago

Sucu, Muhammet Buğra. 2024. “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat”. Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis 9 (3): 1011-48. https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1473087.

EndNote

Sucu MB (October 1, 2024) Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis 9 3 1011–1048.

IEEE

[1]M. B. Sucu, “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat”, Beta, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 1011–1048, Oct. 2024, doi: 10.25229/beta.1473087.

ISNAD

Sucu, Muhammet Buğra. “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat”. Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis 9/3 (October 1, 2024): 1011-1048. https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1473087.

JAMA

1.Sucu MB. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Beta. 2024;9:1011–1048.

MLA

Sucu, Muhammet Buğra. “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat”. Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis, vol. 9, no. 3, Oct. 2024, pp. 1011-48, doi:10.25229/beta.1473087.

Vancouver

1.Muhammet Buğra Sucu. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Beta. 2024 Oct. 1;9(3):1011-48. doi:10.25229/beta.1473087