Strategies For Allocating Radio Frequencies: Federal Communications Commission Wireless Spectrum Auctions

Abstract

The intensive use of wireless spectrum in communications necessitates complex allocation mechanisms for spectrum licenses. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses simultaneous ascending auctions, an innovative auction mechanism, to address the complexities created by the frequencies, bandwidths and geographic locations of spectrum licenses. In this study I discuss the objectives of spectrum auctions, and analyze the strategic auction design issues faced by the FCC; including price discovery, exposure, and information disclosure problems. Finally, I analyze how the FCC addresses these issues in light of the simultaneous ascending auction mechanism, and identify areas for improvement in strategic spectrum auction design.

Keywords

• FCC, Radio Frequency, Wireless Spectrum, Auction Design

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