AN ANALYSIS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF RIGHTS ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN BORSA ISTANBUL

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to measure market reaction to rights issue announcements in Borsa İstanbul. Also, the study aims to examine the factors behind the market reaction. The event study methodology is conducted to analyse the announcements made between 2010-2019 retrieved from Public Disclosure Platform (PDP). Consistent with the existing literature, a negative market reaction to the rights offering announcements is detected. However, the market reaction turns to be positive when firms apply for private placements. The negative reaction is also eliminated when firms apply bonus issues simultaneously with rights issues. The study provides evidence regarding the validity of information asymmetry and pecking order theory for Borsa Istanbul for the case of rights offerings. In addition, the announcement content of PDP announcements allows us to investigate the factors that may trigger the market reaction. However, we cannot document any difference for the market reaction according to commitment type, the use of proceeds, industrial classification and issue sequence. The paper’s originality can be attributed to investigating the information content of PDP announcements with the current data regarding the rights offerings and its market reaction.

Keywords

• Information Asymmetry
• Pecking Order Theory
• Announcement Effect
• Borsa Istanbul
• Rights Issue

BORSA İSTANBUL’DAKİ BEDELLİ SERMAYE ARTIRIMI HABERLERİNİN ETKİLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

Abstract

Çalışmamızın amacı, Borsa İstanbul’daki yatırımcıların bedelli sermaye artırımı duyurusu yapan şirketlere verdiği tepkiyi ölçmek ve tepkinin nedenlerini ortaya çıkarmaktır. Çalışma, 2010 – 2019 yılları arasında Kamu Aydınlatma Platformu (KAP) ile halka duyurulan bedelli ihraç haberlerininin halka açık şirketlerin hisse senedi fiyatlarına olan tepkisini olay yöntemi kullanarak incelemektedir. Önceki çalışmalarla tutarlı olarak, bedelli sermaye artırım duyurularının yatırımcılar tarafından olumsuz algılandığı tespit edilmiştir. Tahsisli yapılan bedelli ihraçlarında ise piyasa tepkisi olumlu gerçekleşmektedir. Bedelsiz sermaye artırımının bedelli ihracı ile birlikte yapılması piyasa tepkisini olumlu yönde etkilemektedir. Borsa İstanbul için bedelli sermaye artırımları kapsamında bilgi asimetrisinin ve finansal hiyerarşi teorisinin varlığına ilişkin kanıtlar sunulmaktadır. Ek olarak, KAP haberlerindeki bilgi içeriği sayesinde farklı analizler yapılabilmiştir. Piyasa tepkisinin, sermaye artışına taahhüt verilmesine ya da kullanım amacına göre farklılaşmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, sıklıkla bedelli sermaye artırşı yapan şirkelerin ve sektörel karşılaştırmanın da piyasa tepkisi açısından anlamlı olarak ayrışmadığı söylenebilmektedir. KAP haber içeriklerinin güncel verilerle detaylı olarak incelenmesi ve buna yönelik analizler yapılması çalışmamızın özgün yanları arasında bulunmaktadır.

Keywords

• Bedelli Sermaye Artırımı
• Bilgi Asimetrisi
• Finansal Hiyerarşi Teorisi
• Duyuru Etkisi
• Borsa İstanbul

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