Discussion of the Propounded Identicalness Thesis for Proper Nouns, Physical Situations and Mental Situations in Kripke

Year 2017, Volume: 7 Issue: 2, 51 - 74, 30.12.2017

Vedat Çelebi

https://doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.375780

Abstract

In this study, Kripke's
claim, that within the framework of the possible worlds argument, the
identification of mental processes by being reduced to physical events
doesn't have an imperative base is addressed. Theories of physicalism
and identity aims to explain the mental processes in a thoroughly
physical way, thus trying to reduce it to the physical one, through
brain events. According to Kripke, there must be an imperativeness for
the identification of mental states with physical states. According to
him, however, it is not possible to show that physical events
necessarily reveal mental processes. According to Kripke, in order to be
imperatively correct for one statement, it must be correct in all
possible worlds. Kripke uses the concept of "rigid designator" to
describe this situation. According to Kripke, the thesis of identity
between rigid designators must be metaphysically imperative correct.
This situation does not apply to mental events. So then, the aim of this
article is to reveal why the thesis of identity proposed in the
explanation of physical and mental situations in terms of Kripke is not
valid.

Keywords

Kripke, identity, proper nouns, mental and physical situations, rigid designators

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