Çin’in Keşmir Politikası: Pakistan ve Hindistan Arasında Dengeli Tarafsızlık

Öz

Bu çalışma, son dönemde Keşmir’le ilgili gelişmeler çerçevesinde Çin’in soruna yaklaşımındaki değişimleri incelemektedir. Çin’in Pakistan yanlısı Keşmir politikası, 1980’lerden itibaren “tarafsızlık” olarak nitelenebilecek Pakistan-Hindistan arasında daha dengeli bir yaklaşıma kaymıştır. Çin bir yandan Pakistan’ın savunduğu sorunu uluslararasılaştırma politikasına diplomatik desteğini azaltırken, diğer yandan da BMGK’da İslamabad’a yönelik terörle ilgili gösterme çabalarını engellemiştir. Çin, Pakistan-Hindistan arasındaki krizlerde de yatıştırıcı, savaşı önleyici bir rol oynamaktadır. Diğer yandan, Hindistan, Çin’in 2015’te başlattığı Pakistan’ın kontrol ettiği Keşmir’den geçen Çin-Pakistan Ekonomik Koridoru’na karşı çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca Pekin’in Keşmir politikasını, Çin-Hindistan arasındaki gerilimler, Yeni Delhi’nin Hint-Pasifik stratejisinin aktif bir üyesine dönüşmesini etkilemeye başladığı görülmektedir. Çin’in, son zamanlarda Keşmir konusundaki Pakistan yanlısı açıklamaları mevcut dış politika yaklaşımındaki soru işaretlerini arttırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Çin’in Keşmir politikasının son 10 yıldaki temel dinamiklerinin nasıl şekillendiği ve “tarafsız” olarak nitelendirilen yaklaşımın dönüşümü analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu makaledeki temel argüman Çin’in Keşmir politikasının mevcut statükodan taviz vermeden kendi ulusal çıkarlarını koruma, Hindistan’ı dengeleme temelinde değişken bir tarafsızlığı takip ettiğini savunmaktadır. Bu nedenle Çin’in Keşmir politikasının salt bir tarafsızlık üzerine kurulu olduğunu savunmak mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla Çin’in Keşmir politikasının Çin-Hindistan ikili ilişkileri ve bölgesel jeopolitik ve jeo-ekonomik değişimlere göre şekillenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Çin
• Hindistan
• Pakistan
• Keşmir sorunu
• tarafsızlık

CHINA’S KASHMIR POLICY: BALANCED NEUTRALITY BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Öz

The study examines changes in China's stance to the Kashmir issue in light of current Kashmir-related developments. Since the 1980s, China's pro-Pakistan Kashmir policy has changed toward a more balanced approach between Pakistan and India, known as “neutrality”. In the context China has reduced its diplomatic support for Pakistan's policy of internationalizing the issue, while on the other hand it has blocked efforts to link Islamabad to terrorism in the UN Security Council, and other international organizations. Herein, China shields Islamabad from New Delhi's diplomatic pressures on the global platforms, also plays a soothing and war-preventative role in the ongoing Kashmir crises. Conversly, India is opposed to China's the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor via Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In recent years, Beijing's Kashmir policy has been impacted by Sino-Indian tensions and New Delhi's transformation into an active participant of the Indo-Pacific strategy. The recent worsening of Sino-Indian bilateral ties, particularly with the 2020 Galvan Valley crisis, and Beijing's pro-Pakistani views on Kashmir call into question the country's present foreign policy orientation. Within the framework outlined above, it is fair to conclude that, regional and global elements have been actively included into China's Kashmir policy, and signals of change have emerged. This research will attempt to assess how the fundamental dynamics of China's Kashmir policy have evolved over the last ten years, as well as the transformation of the approach, which was classified as “neutral”, and the reasons behind this. The main argument in this article is that China's Kashmir policy has been pursuing a shifting neutrality based on balancing India, seeking to protect its national interests without compromising the status quo. Therefore, it’s impossible to call that China's Kashmir policy is completely impartial. China's Kashmir policy is determined by bilateral relations with India, as well as regional geopolitical and geostrategic shifts.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• China
• India
• Pakistan
• Kashmir Issue
• Neutrality

Kaynakça

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