VERGİ GELİRLERİ VE DEMOKRASİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: YÜKSELEN VE GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELER ÜZERİNE BİR UYGULAMA

Year 2024, , 854 - 871, 20.10.2024

Şeref Can Serin , Murat Demir , Abdulvahap Uluç

https://doi.org/10.35379/cusosbil.1498304

Abstract

Vergiler, devletlerin kamusal mal ve hizmet sunumunu gerçekleştirmek amacıyla egemenlik gücüne dayalı olarak tahsil ettikleri, karşılıksız gelirlerdir. Ancak vergiler başlangıçta devletlerin salt egemenlik gücüne dayandırılırken zaman içerisinde temsil yetkisinden doğan bir yetki haline evrilmiştir. Bu kapsamda vergilendirme ve demokrasi arasındaki bağlantı, mali sosyoloji literatürünün önemli tartışma konularından bir tanesi haline gelmiştir. 13. yüzyıldan itibaren iktisadi ve siyasi reform hareketlerine yön veren arayışlar, temsilsiz vergilendirmeye karşı başlatılan isyanlar, modern kamu mali yapısının evriminde önemli rol oynayarak temsiliyet ve vergilendirme gibi kavramların şekillenmesini sağlamıştır. Söz konusu teorik tartışmalara paralel olarak bir ülkedeki yönetim rejiminin tipolojisinin ölçülme girişimleri sonucunda, demokrasi ve vergilendirme arasındaki bağlantıyı inceleyen geniş bir ampirik literatür oluşmuştur. Ampirik bulgular gelişmiş ekonomiler açısından demokratikleşme ve vergilendirme arasında pozitif bir ilişkinin bulunduğuna, ancak gelişmekte olan ülkeler açısından bu bağlantının muğlak olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu çalışma literatürdeki bu boşluğu dikkate alır boyutta, 41 yükselen ve gelişmekte olan ülke için 2000-2018 döneminde vergi gelirleri üzerinde, demokratikleşme, kentlileşme ve kurumsal kalite göstergelerinin etkilerini dinamik panel veri analiz teknikleriyle incelenmektedir. Bulgularımız yükselen ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler açısından demokratikleşmenin ve kentli nüfusun toplam nüfus içerisindeki payının artmasının vergi gelirleri üzerinde iyileştirici bir etki oluşturduğuna işaret etmektedir.

Keywords

Mali Sosyoloji, Vergilendirme, Demokrasi, Dinamik Panel Veri Analizi, Yükselen ve Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler

Ethical Statement

Çalışma Etik Kurallar Çerçevesinde Hazırlanmıştır.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX REVENUES AND DEMOCRACY: AN APPLICATION ON EMERGING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Abstract

States collect taxes as one-way revenues based on their sovereign power to provide public goods and services. However, over time, taxes have evolved from being based solely on the pure sovereign power of the states to an authority arising from the power of representation. In this context, the connection between taxation and democracy has become one of the critical discussion topics in the fiscal sociology literature. Since the 13th century, the expeditions guiding economic and political reform movements, coupled with rebellions against non-representative taxation, have played a fundamental role in shaping concepts such as representation and taxation in the evolution of the modern public financial structures. In parallel with the theoretical discussions, a broad empirical literature examining the connection between democracy and taxation has emerged due to attempts to measure the typology of political regimes in a country. Empirical findings indicate a positive relationship between democratization and taxation in advanced economies; however, this connection is ambiguous for emerging and developing countries. This study takes this gap in the literature into account and examines the effects of democratization, urbanization, and institutional quality indicators on tax revenues for 41 emerging and developing countries in the 2000-2018 period with dynamic panel data analysis techniques. Our findings indicate that democratization and the increasing share of urban population in total population have a positive impact on tax revenues in the context of emerging and developing countries.

Keywords

Fiscal Sociology, Taxation, Democracy, Dynamic Panel Data Analysis, Emerging and Developing Countries

Ethical Statement

The study was prepared within the framework of ethical rules.

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