Paul Draper, Agnostisizm ve Kötülük Problemi

Abstract

Kötülük probleminin, genellikle, ateizmin bir delili olduğu kabul edilir. Ancak bu varsayımın zorunlu olmadığının kanıtı olarak bazı düşünürler örnek gösterilebilir. Örneğin, literatüre kazandırdığı eserlerine baktığımızda kötülük problemininin kendisi için büyük bir problem olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz, günümüz din felsefesinin önde gelen düşünürlerinden Paul Draper, kendini agnostik olarak tanımlar. Draper, kötülüğün doğrudan agnostisizmi desteklediğini savunmaz, daha ziyade, ateizmi tek başına kanıtlayacak gücü olmadığını savunur. Açıktır ki, kötülük probleminin Draper için yeterince kanıtlama gücü olsaydı, kendisinin agnostik değil ateist olması beklenirdi. Bu çalışmayla, kötülük probleminin, genel olarak, ateizmle ilişkilendirildiği bir ortamda, Draper’in, agnostisizmi nasıl temellendirdiğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktayız. Draper’in kötülük problemi ve agnostisizmi konu edinen çalışmaları ile litaratürde söz konusu tartışmayı ele alan ve Draper’e çeşitli tenkitler yönelten çalışmalara dair eleştirel bir okuma neticesinde, kötülük probleminin neden zorunlu olarak ateizmin bir gerekçesi olamayacağını gösterebilmeyi hedefliyoruz. Aynı şekilde, agnostisizmin temellendirilmesi noktasında, Draper’in litarürde durduğu noktayı açıkça gösterebilmek amacıyla, agnostisizmin temellendirilmesi tartışmasına kısaca değinecek ve Draper’in ‘kötülük probleminden agnostisizme’ geçişinin, ‘kötülükten ateizme’ herhangi bir geçişten daha rasyonel olduğu sonucuna ulaşacağız.

Keywords

• Din Felsefesi
• Kötülük Problemi
• Agnostisizm
• Acı ve Zevk
• Paul Draper

Paul Draper, Agnosticism and the Problem of Evil

Abstract

The problem of evil is generally taken as evidence for atheism. However, some philosophers can be referred as a sign that this is not necessarily so. For example, one of the leading philosophers of contemporary philosophy of religion, Paul Draper, for whom one can say that the problem of evil is a big problem by looking into the works he brought to the literature, defines himself as an agnostic. Draper does not argue that evil directly supports or justifies agnosticism, but rather that it does not have the power to justify atheism on its own. According to him, the evidence presented for and against theism and atheism leads to a balance between these two stances. The balance here does not mean that the evidence creates a fifty percent probability for both parties and makes a choice difficult as a result, but rather that an evaluation of all the evidence opens the way for an ambiguity that makes it difficult to choose between the two. He states that none of the available evidence is sufficient to decisively establish the truth of neither theism nor atheism; and that neither theism nor atheism/naturalism is true. However, while some evidence raises the possibility that theism is true over naturalism whereas others justify atheism by supporting naturalism. So, this kind of ambiguity justifies agnosticism as the true doxastic stance to adhere to. If the problem of evil was sufficient in terms of evidential power for Draper, he would have to be an atheist, not an agnostic. In an atmosphere where the problem of evil is generally associated with atheism, how Draper grounds agnosticism and why the problem of evil cannot necessarily be considered as a justification for atheism by and only itself is the main focus of this article. Thus, this study aims to reveal why the problem of evil cannot necessarily be a justification for atheism, as a result of a critical reading of Draper’s studies on the problem of evil and agnosticism, as well as the studies in the literature that deals with the discussion and criticize Draper. Likewise, in order to illustrate Draper’s argument regarding the grounding of agnosticism decisively, this study will briefly touch on the discussions of the grounding of agnosticism, and conclude that Draper’s move from “the problem of evil to agnosticism” is more rational than any transition from “evil to atheism”.

Keywords

• Philosophy of Religion
• Problem of Evil
• Agnosticism
• Pain and Pleasure
• Paul Draper

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