Zorunlu Varlık: Mantıksal Ve Sade Bir İspat Denemesi

Year 2025, Volume: 25 Issue: 2, 1171 - 1206, 30.09.2025

Mehmet Dallı

https://doi.org/10.33415/daad.1711177

Abstract

Bu çalışma, Joshua Rasmussen’in argümanından hareketle Zorunlu Varlık lehine mantıksal ve sade bir ispat sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Argüman, gerçekliğin bir bütün olarak dışsal bir açıklaması olamayacağından dolayı “kendine yeterli” ve dolayısıyla “bağımsız” olduğu sonucunu çıkarır. Tamamen bağımlı parçalardan ancak ve ancak bağımlı bir bütün oluşabileceği ilkesinden hareketle, bağımlı varlıklar içeren gerçekliğin bağımsızlığını temellendirmek için var olan şeylere zemin teşkil eden bağımsız, zorunlu ve nihâî bir “Temel”in varlığı metafiziksel olarak zorunlu kılınır. Böylece ispat, nedensellik zincirini başlatan zamansal bir ilk nedenden ziyade, her şeyin kendisine dayandığı zemin olan nihâî bir temeli ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

Din Felsefesi , Mantık , Kendine Yeterlilik , Zorunluluk , Sadelik

Necessary Existent: An Attempt at a Logical and Simple Proof

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis and formalization of Joshua Rasmussen's argument for the existence of God, primarily as detailed in his work How Reason Can Lead to God. The central aim of the article is to present a simplified and critically examined version of Rasmussen's line of reasoning, which posits that the acceptance of certain foundational premises and rules of logical inference leads to the logical necessity of a self-sufficient, independent, and ultimate metaphysical Foundation.
The methodology advocated is one of genuine philosophical inquiry, aiming to acquire "knowledge about reality" rather than merely rationalizing pre-existing beliefs. This approach emphasizes reliance on the rules of logic and experiential data within that logical framework, with a rigorous examination of the formal validity of arguments and the veracity of their premises. An essential precondition for such an inquiry is "intellectual humility"—an acknowledgment of the inherent epistemic limitations in fully comprehending ultimate reality and the fallibility of human cognitive tools. This humility distinguishes between paradoxical observations, which may challenge current understanding without being inherently contradictory, and genuine logical contradictions.
The argument commences with the seemingly self-evident, yet crucial, ontological postulate: "at least one thing exists". This is established through a brief reductio argument: if nothing existed, an experiencing self would not exist; therefore, something must exist. Even the possibility of universal illusion confirms the existence of the illusion itself or the experience thereof. Building on this, the concept of a "Blob of Everything" (BOE) is introduced—a conceptual totality encompassing everything that exists, both concrete and abstract.
From the definition of BOE, three interconnected principles are derived. The First Principle states that nothing existing is outside the BOE. The Second Principle, a logical consequence of the first, asserts that nothing outside the BOE caused the BOE to exist, as any existing cause would, by definition, be within the BOE. The Third Principle extends this reasoning to explanations, contending that nothing outside the BOE can explain why or how the BOE exists. Collectively, these principles lead to the conclusion that reality, as a whole, cannot possess an external cause or explanation, implying it must be "self-sufficient".
This raises a fundamental question: How can reality be self-sufficient when common experience suggests that contingent objects require external explanations for their existence? If a single, contingent entity (like a lump of playdough, to use Rasmussen's example) cannot exist in isolation without an external explanation, then a mere aggregation of such dependent entities would similarly require one. Yet, reality undeniably exists. To resolve this, Rasmussen introduces the "Foundation Theory". This theory posits that reality's self-sufficiency is explicable through the existence of a "Foundation". Thus, the answer to the perennial question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" becomes: "There is something because the Foundation exists". This Foundation is conceived as inherently "self-standing" and "ultimate," upon which all else depends.
The article underscores that the argument’s reliance on "only rules of logic" signifies a commitment to using logical inference based on intuitively evident propositions. Methodological doubt is presented not as a barrier but as a constructive starting point that triggers inquiry and allows for the continuous revision and strengthening of the argumentative "bridge of reason".
For such a proof to be deemed the "simplest," it must satisfy three critical thresholds: logical validity (conclusions must follow soundly from premises via recognized inference rules), premise reliability (the assumptions, particularly any form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, must be epistemically defensible), and explanatory superiority (the God hypothesis must offer a simpler and more comprehensive account than alternative "foundationless" or "mindless foundation" scenarios).
In conclusion, the paper presents Rasmussen's argument as an attempt to demonstrate that, given certain premises and the rigorous application of logic, the existence of an ultimate, necessary metaphysical Foundation becomes a logical imperative. While acknowledging that the epistemic grounding of this necessity might rely on certain modal intuitions (such as the universality of the PSR), the argument aims to show that the concept of such a Foundation—aligning with the traditional attributes of God—offers the most coherent and parsimonious explanation for reality's existence and self-sufficiency. This philosophical endeavor also carries the potential to offer profound insights into existential questions and the meaning of life.

Keywords

Philosophy of Religion , Logic , Self-Sufficiency , Necessity , Simplicity

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