A WITTGENSTEINIAN DEFENSE OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

Year 2021, Volume: 8 Issue: 2, 114 - 126, 30.10.2021

Nazim Keven

Abstract

Ordinary language philosophy is concerned with producing a philosophical insight and sometimes dissolving a pseudo-philosophical problem by looking at ordinary uses of language. There are numerous philosophers in the ordinary language philosophy tradition, notably Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin. They each offered their respective versions of ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language philosophy was fashionable during the thirties and forties in Britain, but it mysteriously lost its popularity after the fifties. Perhaps objections against ordinary language philosophy, notably by philosophers such as Fodor and Katz, Russell, Gellner and so on, have led to its demise. In this paper, I present a Wittgensteinian reconstruction of ordinary language philosophy. I argue that such a reconstruction can deal with all of the aforementioned objections. Moreover, a Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophy offers a viable methodology for philosophy.

Keywords

Family resemblance, language game, thought experiment, form of life

Thanks

This work was supported by the BAGEP Award of the Science Academy.

GÜNDELİK DİL FELSEFESİNİN WİTTGENSTEİNCI BİR SAVUNMASI

Abstract

Gündelik dil felsefesi bir felsefi öngörü üretmeye ve bazen de bir felsefi problemi çözümlemeye çalışır. Aralarında Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin gibi ünlü isimlerinde bulunduğu bir çok felsefeci gündelik dil felsefesi geleneğinde yer almıştır. Her biri kendi gündelik dil felsefesi versiyonunu sunmuştur. Gündelik dil felsefesi İngiltere'de özellikle otuzlar ve kırklarda popüler olmuş ama daha sonra ellilerde gizemli bir şekilde popülaritesini kaybetmiştir. Fodor ve Katz, Russell, Gellner ve benzeri felsefecilerin dile getirdiği itirazlar gündelik dil felsefesinin yok olmasında etkili olmuştur diyebiliriz. Bu makalede gündelik dil felsefesini Wittgensteincı bir versiyonu sunuyorum. Bu Wittgensteincı versiyonun adı geçen itirazların hepsine cevap verebileceğini savunuyorum. Ayrıca Wittgensteincı bir dil felsefesinin felsefenin geneli için de uygun bir metodoloji önerdiğini iddaa ediyorum.

Keywords

Aile benzerliği, Dil Oyunları, Yaşam Biçimi, Wittgenstein, Düşünce deneyi

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