AXIO-SYSTEMIC VALIDITY: POSITIVISM WITH REASON

Yıl 2021, , 517 - 569, 24.05.2021

Yahya Berkol Gülgeç

https://doi.org/10.33717/deuhfd.899912

Öz

Systemic validity is generally in conformity with the understanding of
validity adopted by legal officials. On the other hand, it suffers from an inability
to account for why an enactment in conformity with the systemic criteria
constitutes a norm. Axio-systemic validity aims to compensate this deficiency by
introducing a hybrid understanding of validity. While the systemic component
continues the descriptive and explanatory advantages, the minimum axiological
element guarantees that the enactments possess the character of norms. While
axio-systemic validity violates the social fact and sources theses, it is compatible
with the separability thesis. Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist
understanding of validity

Anahtar Kelimeler

Systemic validity, Axiological validity, Legal positivism, Reason for action, Separability thesis

Kaynakça

• Aarnio, Aulis: The Rational As Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Justification, Dordrecht 1987.
• Alchourrón, Carlos E./Bulygin, Eugenio: “The Expressive Conception of Norms”, in New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions and the Foundations of Ethics, ed. Risto Hilpinen, Dordrecht 1981, pp. 95-124.
• Alexy, Robert: "On the Structure of Legal Principles", Ratio Juris, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, pp. 294-304.
• Alexy, Robert: The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, trns. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford 2004.
• Antonov¸ Mikhail: “Systemicity of Law: A Phantasm”, Russian Journal of Law, Vol. 3., No. 3, 2015, pp. 110-125.
• Aral, Vecdi: “Kelsen’in Hukuk Anlayışı”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, Vol. 31, No. 1-4, pp. 513-552.
• Austin, John: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2nd Edition, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble, Cambridge 2001.
• Barnett, Hilaire: Constitutional and Administrative Law, London 2002.
• Bratman¸ Michael E.: “Reflections on Law, Normativity and Plans”, in New Essays on the Normativity of Law, eds. Stefano Bertea and George Pavlakso, Oxford 2011, pp. 73-85.
• Coleman, Jules L.: “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis”, Legal Theory, No. 4, 1998, pp. 381-426.
• Coleman, Jules L.: “Negative and Positive Positivism”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1982, pp. 139-164.
• Coleman, Jules L.: “Rules and Social Facts”, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 703-726.
• Crisp, Roger: “Prudential and Moral Reasons”, in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star, Oxford 2018, pp. 800-820.
• Delacroix, Sylvie: Legal Norms and Normativity: An Essay in Genealogy, Portland 2006.
• Duxbury, Neil: “Kelsen’s Endgame”, The Cambridge Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 51-61.
• Dworkin, Ronald M.: “The Model of Rules”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, Autumn 1967, pp. 14-46.
• Edmundson, William A.: Three Anarchical Fallacies: An Essay on Political Authority, Cambridge 1988.
• Eliasz, Katarzyna/Załuski, Wojciech: “Critical Remarks on Alf Ross’s Probabilistic Concept of Validity”, PRINCIPIA, Vol. 61-62, 2015, pp. 245-257.
• Feis, Guglielmo: “Ought Implies Can: Counter-Examples and Intentions”, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2017, pp. 37-52.
• Ferreira, Nick: “Feasibility Constraints and Human Rights: Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’”, South African Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2012, pp. 483-505.
• Finnis, John: “Natural Law: The Classical Tradition”, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, eds. Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma and Scott J. Shapiro, Oxford 2004, pp. 1-60.
• Finnis, John: “On Hart’s Ways: Las as Reason and as Fact”, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2007, pp. 25-53.
• Gardner, John: “Legal Positivism 5 ½ Myths”, American Journal of Jurisprudence, No. 46, 2001, pp. 199-228.
• Gözler, Kemal: Hukuka Giriş, 10th Edition, Bursa 2013.
• Gözler, Kemal: Hukukun Genel Teorisine Giriş: Hukuk Normlarının Geçerliliği ve Yorumu Sorunu, Ankara 1998.
• Gözler, Kemal: Türk Anayasa Hukuku, 2nd Edition, Bursa 2018, pp. 655- 656.
• Grabowski, Andrzej: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law: A Critique of Contemporary Legal Nonpositivism, trns. Małgorzata Kiełtyka, Berlin 2013.
• Gregory, Alex: “Normative Reasons as Good Bases”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 9, 2016, pp. 2291-2310.
• Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol: Normativite ve Pozitivizm, İstanbul 2020, On İki Levha.
• Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol: “Interrelationship Between Validity, Efficacy and Coerciveness”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2017, pp. 677-730.
• Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol: Lex Superior İlkesi: Hukuki Geçerliliği ve Uygulaması, İstanbul 2018.
• Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol: Normlar Hiyerarşisi: Türk, Alman ve İngiliz Hukuk Sistemlerinde Kural İşlemlerin ve Mahkeme Kararlarının Hiyerarşik Gücü, 2nd Edition, İstanbul 2018.
• Haldemann, Frank: “Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2005, p. 162-178.
• Hart, H.L.A.: “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, February 1958, pp. 593-629.
• Hart, H.L.A.: The Concept of Law, 3rd Edition, Oxford 2012.
• Hauser, Raimund: Norm, Recht und Staat, Vienna 1968.
• Himma, Kenneth Einar: “Coercive Enforcement and a Positivist Theory of Legal Obligation”, Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade International Edition, Year: LX, No. 2, 2012, pp. 216-242.
• Himma, Kenneth Einar: “H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis”, Legal Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-43.
• Himma, Kenneth Einar: “Inclusive Legal Positivism”, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, eds. Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma and Scott J. Shapiro, Oxford 2004, pp. 125-165.
• Himma, Kenneth Einar: “The Ties That Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2013, pp. 16-46.
• Himma, Kenneth Einar: “Towards a Comprehensive Positivist Theory of Legal Obligation”, Ankara Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2012, pp. 109- 134.
• Hruschka, Joachim: “Verhaltensregeln und Zurechnungsregeln”, Rechtstheorie, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1991, pp. 449-460.
• Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 11th Edition, trns. Mary Gregor, ed. Mary Gregor, Cambridge 2006.
• Kant, Immanuel: The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge 2000.
• Kelsen, Hans: General Theory of Law and State, 3rd Edition, trns. Anders Wedberg, Cambridge 1949.
• Kelsen, Hans: General Theory of Norms, trns. Michael Hartney, Oxford 1991.
• Kelsen, Hans: Pure Theory of Law, 5th Edition, trns. Max Knight, New Jersey 2008.
• Korsgaard, Christine M.: “Normativity of Instrumental Reason, in Ethics and Practical Reason, eds. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, Oxford 2003, pp. 215-254.
• Kramer, Matthew H.: “Requirements, Reasons and Raz: Legal Positivism and Legal Duties”, Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 2, January 1999, pp. 375-407.
• Kühl, Kristian: “Radbruch Formülü”, trns. Mehmet Cemil Ozansü, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, Vol. LXX, No. 1, pp. 369- 374.
• Marmor, Andrei: “Exclusive Legal Positivism”, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, eds. Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma and Scott J. Shapiro, Oxford 2004, pp. 103-124.
• Moreso, José Juan: “In Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism”, Dritto & Questioni, No. 1, 2001, pp. 99-117.
• Munzer, Stephen: Legal Validity, The Hague 1972.
• Peczenik, Alexander: “The Structure of a Legal System”, Rechtstheorie, Vol. 6, No. 1-2, 1975, pp. 1-16.
• Pino, Giorgio: “Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals”, Ratio Juris, No. 190, 2014, pp. 190-217.
• Radbruch, Gustav: “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht”, Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung, Vol. 1, No. 5, August 1946, pp. 105-108.
• Raitio, Juha: “What is Meant by Legal Certainty and Unvertainty”, Rechtstheorie, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2006, pp. 393-405.
• Raz, Joseph: Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, Oxford 2009.
• Raz, Joseph: From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford 2011.
• Raz, Joseph: “Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm”, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1975, pp. 94-111.
• Raz, Joseph: “Legal Validity”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Vol. 63, No. 3, 1977, pp. 339-353.
• Raz, Joseph: Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford 1999.
• Raz, Joseph: “Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms”, in Practical Reasoning, ed. Joseph Raz, Oxford 1978, pp. 128-143.
• Raz, Joseph: The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford 1979.
• Raz, Joseph: “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality”, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 1-28 (available atat https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2252, Date of Access: 4 November 2020).
• Ross, Alf: “Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law”, in Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, eds. Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson, Oxford 1998, pp. 147-163.
• Rüthers, Bernd: Rechtstheorie: Begriff, Geltung und Anwendung des Rechts¸ Munich, 1999.
• Shapiro, Scott J: Legality, Cambridge 2011.
• Shapiro, Scott J.: “Planning Agency and the Law”, in New Essays on the Normativity of Law, eds. Stefano Bertea and George Pavlakos, Oxford 2011, pp. 18-72.
• Sherwyn, Emily: “Legality and Rationality: A Comment on Scott Shapiro’s Legality”, Legal Theory, No. 19, 2013, pp. 403-421.
• Smith¸M.B.E.: “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 82, No. 5, 1973, pp. 950-976.
• Stewart, Iain: “Closure and the Legal Norm: An Essay in Critique of Law”, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 7, 1987, pp. 908-933.
• Waluchow, Wil: “Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism”, Legal Theory, No. 6, 2000, pp. 45-81.
• Wedgwood, Ralph: The Nature of Normativity, Oxford 2007.
• Wróblewski¸ Jerzy: “Problems of Objective Validity of Norms”, Rechtstheorie, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1983, pp. 19-28.
• Wróblewski¸Jerzy: The Judicial Application of Law, eds. Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick, Berlin 1992.
• Ziembiński, Zygmunt: Practical Logic, trns. Leon Ter-Oganian, Dordrecht 1976, p. 62.
• Zorzetto, Silvia: “Thinking of Impossibility in Following Legal Norms: Some Brief Comments About Bartosz Brożek’s Rule-Following”, Revus, No. 20, 2013, pp. 47-60.