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Internatıonal relatıons and ratıonalıty: the contrıbutıon of bureaucratıc polıtıcs to the fıeld and the ımportance of the ratıonalıty assumptıon ın predıctıng the future

Year 2012, Volume: 14 Issue: 3, 85 - 103, 01.04.2012

Abstract

Having embraced the assumption of the individual's rationality, most studies in International Relations conclude that groups, institutions, and states are also rational actors and can take rational decisions. To these assumptions the strongest criticism so far has come from bureaucratic-politics studies. This article, through reviewing the seminal works in bureaucratic politics, reflects on the criticisms leveled against the rationality assumption at three basic levels, namely individual, group, and bureaucracy. Although bureaucratic politics has made invaluable contribution to the field by demonstrating that actors sometimes did not and cannot take rational decisions, if social scientists' objective is not only explanation and understanding but also prediction, then, the rationality assumption is somewhat necessary. Those social scientists, who have been trying to contribute to the development of social science and to provide policy suggestions with leaders and policy makers, will need to adopt the assumption of rationality and simplify complex social issues and the data in hand. This conclusion does not mean that we can underestimate the frequency or the importance of irrational behavior in international politics, but that social scientists working under the assumption of rationality can better hope that we can predict future events.

References

  • Ak, Ö. (2009). Dış politika analizi ve liderlik: Süleymaniye krizi sürecinde R. T. Erdoğan örneği. Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara
  • Aksu, M. (2004). Türk dış politikası karar alma mekanizmasının işleyişi: II. Körfez krizi örneği.” Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Isparta
  • Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. The American Political Science Review, 63 (3): 689-718
  • Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis. London: Scott, Foresman and Company
  • Baldwin, D. (Der.) (1993). Neorealism and neoliberalism: contemporary debate. New York: Columbia University Press
  • the Buzan, B. (1996). The timeless wisdom of realism. İçinde S.Smith, K
  • Booth, M. Zalewski (Der.). International theory: positivism and beyond: 47-65
  • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Dent, S. (Der.) (1945). Encore: a continuing anthology (Mart 1945), “Fischerisms,” s. 309
  • Dixit, A. (2009). Democracy, autocracy, and bureaucracy
  • http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/DeAuBu04.pdf (15.02.2012) Elster, J. (1989). Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Ereker, F. (2010). Dış politika ve kimlik: inşacı perspektiften Türk dış politikasının analizi. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi. Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara
  • Faber, J. (1990). On bounded rationality and the framing of decisions in international relations: towards a dynamic network model of world politics, Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3): 307-319
  • Halperin, M. H. (1974). Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy
  • Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution
  • Jablonsky, D. (1991). Strategic rationality is not enough: Hitler and the concept of crazy states. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
  • Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: a psychological study of foreign- policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company
  • Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics
  • Princeton: Princeton University Press
  • Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30 (2): 167-174
  • Johnson, P. M. (2001). Effects of groupthink on tactical decision-making
  • Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies
  • Jones, B. D. (2003). Bounded rationality and political science: lessons from public administration and public policy. Journal of Public Administration and Theory, 13 (4): 395- 412
  • Kahler, M. (1998). Rationality in international relations. International Organization, 52 (4): 919-941
  • Keohane, R. O. (Der.) (1986). Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press
  • Kobayashi, M. (2005). U.S. failures in the Pearl Harbor attack: lessons for intelligence. Medford, MA: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  • Krasner, S. D. (1972). Are bureaucracies important (or Allison wonderland). Foreign Policy, 1972 (7): 159-179
  • Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
  • Langlois, C. C. ve Langlois, J-P P. (1996). Rationality in international relations: a game-theoretic and empirical study of the U.S.-China case. World Politics, 48 (3): 358-390
  • Lebow, R. N. (1981). Between peace and war: the nature of international crisis. Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press
  • Lipson, C. (1993). International cooperation in economic and security affairs. İçinde D. Baldwin (Der.) Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate: 60-85. New York: Columbia University Press
  • Martin, H. ve Smith, S. (1990). Explaining and understanding in international relations. New York: Oxford University Press
  • Mercer, J. (2005). Rationality and psychology in international politics
  • International Organization, 59 (1): 77-106
  • Scott, W. A. (1958). Rationality and non-rationality of international attitudes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2 (1): 8-16
  • Stoessinger, J. G. (1990). Nations in darkness: China, Russia, and America. 5. Baskı.New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
  • T’Hart, P. (1991). Irving L. Janis’ victims of groupthink. Political Psychology , 12 (2): 247-278
  • Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw- Hill

Uluslararası ilişkiler ve rasyonellik: bürokratik politikanın alana katkısı ve geleceğin öngörülmesinde rasyonellik varsayımının önemi

Year 2012, Volume: 14 Issue: 3, 85 - 103, 01.04.2012

Abstract

Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe genel olarak bireylerin “rasyonel” olduğundan hareket edilerek, tümevarımsal yöntemle kurumların ve devletlerin de rasyonel aktörler olduğu ve rasyonel kararlar aldığı varsayılır. Bu varsayıma en kapsamlı eleştiri “bürokratik politika” çalışmalarından gelmiştir. Makale, bürokrasi, grup ve birey düzeylerinde bürokratik politikanın rasyonellik varsayımına getirdiği eleştirileri alanın en önemli eserlerine değinerek ele almaktadır. Her ne kadar bürokratik politika aktörlerin bazen rasyonel kararlar almadığını ve alamayacağını ortaya koysa da, eğer bilim ve teoriden amacımız açıklama ve anlamaya ek olarak geleceği de öngörmekse, rasyonellik varsayımına ihtiyacımız vardır. Sosyal bilimlerin gelişimine katkıda bulunma ve karar alıcılara tavsiyeler verme amacındaki bilim insanları, karmaşık veriler ile olayları basitleştirmeye ve aktörlerin rasyonel olduğunu varsaymaya ihtiyaç duyacaklardır. Bu sonuç, uluslararası politikada irrasyonel davranış ve kararların azımsanacak oranda olduğunu değil, rasyonellik varsayımını benimseyen bilim insanının geleceği öngörmede daha umutlu olacağını vurgulamaktadır.

References

  • Ak, Ö. (2009). Dış politika analizi ve liderlik: Süleymaniye krizi sürecinde R. T. Erdoğan örneği. Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara
  • Aksu, M. (2004). Türk dış politikası karar alma mekanizmasının işleyişi: II. Körfez krizi örneği.” Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Isparta
  • Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. The American Political Science Review, 63 (3): 689-718
  • Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis. London: Scott, Foresman and Company
  • Baldwin, D. (Der.) (1993). Neorealism and neoliberalism: contemporary debate. New York: Columbia University Press
  • the Buzan, B. (1996). The timeless wisdom of realism. İçinde S.Smith, K
  • Booth, M. Zalewski (Der.). International theory: positivism and beyond: 47-65
  • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Dent, S. (Der.) (1945). Encore: a continuing anthology (Mart 1945), “Fischerisms,” s. 309
  • Dixit, A. (2009). Democracy, autocracy, and bureaucracy
  • http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/DeAuBu04.pdf (15.02.2012) Elster, J. (1989). Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Ereker, F. (2010). Dış politika ve kimlik: inşacı perspektiften Türk dış politikasının analizi. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi. Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara
  • Faber, J. (1990). On bounded rationality and the framing of decisions in international relations: towards a dynamic network model of world politics, Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3): 307-319
  • Halperin, M. H. (1974). Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy
  • Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution
  • Jablonsky, D. (1991). Strategic rationality is not enough: Hitler and the concept of crazy states. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
  • Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: a psychological study of foreign- policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company
  • Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics
  • Princeton: Princeton University Press
  • Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30 (2): 167-174
  • Johnson, P. M. (2001). Effects of groupthink on tactical decision-making
  • Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies
  • Jones, B. D. (2003). Bounded rationality and political science: lessons from public administration and public policy. Journal of Public Administration and Theory, 13 (4): 395- 412
  • Kahler, M. (1998). Rationality in international relations. International Organization, 52 (4): 919-941
  • Keohane, R. O. (Der.) (1986). Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press
  • Kobayashi, M. (2005). U.S. failures in the Pearl Harbor attack: lessons for intelligence. Medford, MA: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  • Krasner, S. D. (1972). Are bureaucracies important (or Allison wonderland). Foreign Policy, 1972 (7): 159-179
  • Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
  • Langlois, C. C. ve Langlois, J-P P. (1996). Rationality in international relations: a game-theoretic and empirical study of the U.S.-China case. World Politics, 48 (3): 358-390
  • Lebow, R. N. (1981). Between peace and war: the nature of international crisis. Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press
  • Lipson, C. (1993). International cooperation in economic and security affairs. İçinde D. Baldwin (Der.) Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate: 60-85. New York: Columbia University Press
  • Martin, H. ve Smith, S. (1990). Explaining and understanding in international relations. New York: Oxford University Press
  • Mercer, J. (2005). Rationality and psychology in international politics
  • International Organization, 59 (1): 77-106
  • Scott, W. A. (1958). Rationality and non-rationality of international attitudes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2 (1): 8-16
  • Stoessinger, J. G. (1990). Nations in darkness: China, Russia, and America. 5. Baskı.New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
  • T’Hart, P. (1991). Irving L. Janis’ victims of groupthink. Political Psychology , 12 (2): 247-278
  • Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw- Hill
There are 38 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Nejat Doğan This is me

Publication Date April 1, 2012
Submission Date August 16, 2014
Published in Issue Year 2012 Volume: 14 Issue: 3

Cite

APA Doğan, N. (2012). Uluslararası ilişkiler ve rasyonellik: bürokratik politikanın alana katkısı ve geleceğin öngörülmesinde rasyonellik varsayımının önemi. Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 14(3), 85-103.