İKTİSADİ ETKİNLİK ÜZERİNE BİR DENEME: X ETKİNLİK YAKLAŞIMI

Abstract

İktisat, uzun yıllar boyunca iktisadi etkinlik olarak Neoklasik-Pareto etkinlik teorisini kullanmıştır. İktisadi hayatın etkinliğini-etkisizliğini açıklamaya yeterli olmayan bu görüşe karşı bazı yaklaşımlar getirilmesine karşın, halihazırda modern iktisat teorisinin kullanmış olduğu genel ve kapsayıcı bir iktisadi etkinlik tanımlaması yapılamamıştır. İktisadi etkinlik üzerine devam eden tartışmanın boyutları, X etkinlik yaklaşımından, modern firma teorilerine kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu deneme, X etkinlik teorisinden yola çıkarak, gerçek iktisadi hayatta var olan etkinsizlik kaynaklarını irdelemeyi ve iktisadi etkinliğin, günümüz piyasa ilişkilerindeki belirleyicilerini modellemeyi hedeflemektedir.

Keywords

• Pareto Etkinlik, X Etkinlik, Çaba

AN ESSAY ON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: X-EFFICIENCY APPROACH

Abstract

Economics has used Neoclassical-Pareto Efficiency Theory as economic efficiency for a long time. However, this theory is not sufficient to explain the in efficiencies of the real economic activity. Although some approaches have introduced against the conventional theory, a more general and comprehensive explanation on efficiency is that engaged by modern economic theory has not yet been in force. The dimensions of ongoing controversy has reached from X in efficiency approach to the modern theories of the firm. Departing X in efficiency approach, the aim of this essay is to study the sources of efficiency existing in the real economic life and to model its determinants within today’s market relations

Keywords

• Pareto Efficiency, X Efficiency, Effort

References

1. ALCHIAN, A., DEMSETZ, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. The Amreican Economic Review. 62 (5), 777-795. ss.
2. BARON, D. (1989). Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions. R. SCHMALENSEE, R. WILLIG (ed.), Handbook of industrial organization Amsterdam: North Holland.
3. BERGSMAN, J. (1974). Commercial policy, allocative efficiency, and x efficiency. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88 (3), 409-433. ss.
4. BORENSTEIN, S., FARRELL, J. (2000). Is cost-cutting evidence of x-inefficiency. The American Economic Review, 90 (2), 224-227. ss.
5. BROUSSEAU, E., GLACHANT, M. (2002). The Economics of contracts and the renewal of economics. E. BROUSSEAU, M. GLACHANT (ed.), The economics of contracts: theories and applications İçinde. London: Cambridge University Press.
6. CARLTON, D., PERLOFF, J. (1994). Modern industrial organization. 2. bs., New York: Harper Collins.
7. CHEUNG, S. (1983). The contractual nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (1), 1-21. ss.
8. COASE, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4 (N.S.), 386-405. ss.

9. COASE, R. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1), 1-44. ss.
10. CONLISK, J. (1996). Bounded rationality and market fluctations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29 (2), 233-250. ss.
11. COOTER, R., ULEN, T. (2004). Law and economics. 4. bs., Addison Wesley Longman.
12. COWEN, T., PARKER, D. (1997). Markets in the firm: A market-process approach to management, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
13. DE ALESSI, L. (1983). Property rights, transaction costs, and x-efficiency: An essay in economic theory. The Ameracan Economic Review, 73 (1), 64-81. ss.
14. DEMSETZ, H. (1983). The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 375-390. ss.
15. ELLINGSEN, T. (1997). Efficiency wages and x inefficiencies. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99 (4), 581-596. ss.
16. FRANTZ, R., TOMER, J., LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1982). Worker motivation and x-efficiency theory: A comment. Journal of Economic Issues, 16 (3), 864-873. ss.
17. FURUBOTN, E. (1991). General equilibrium models, transaction costs, and the concept of efficient allocation in a capitalist economy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 147 (3), 662-686. ss.
18. HART, O. (1988). Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), 119-139. ss.
19. HART, O. (1990). Is bounded rationality an important element of a theory of institutions?. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (4), 696-702. ss.
20. JOSKOW, P. (1985). Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning electric generating plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), 33-80. ss.
21. JOSKOW, P. (2005). Vertical Integration, C. MENARD, M. SHIRLEY (ed.), Handbook of new institutional economics İçinde, Netherlands: Springer.
22. KLEIN, B., CRAWFORD, R., ALCHAIN, A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (2), 297-326. ss.
23. LEACH, J. (2004). A course in public economics. London: Cambridge University Press.
24. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1966). Allocative efficiency versus x-efficiency. American Economic Review, 56 (3), 392-415. ss.
25. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1973). Competition and x-efficiency: Reply. The Journal of Political Economy, 81 (3), 765-777. ss.
26. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1975). Aspects of the x-efficiency theory of the firm. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (2), 580-606. ss.
27. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1978). General x-efficiency theory and economic development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1983). Intrafirm productivity: Reply. American Economic Review, 73 (2), 822-823. ss.
29. MAJUMDAR, S. (1995). X-efficiency in emerging competitive markets: The case of U.S. telecommunications. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26 (1), 129-144. ss.
30. MALIN, E., MARTIMORT, D. (2002). Transaction costs and incentive theory. E. BROUSSEAU, J. GLACHANT (ed.), The economics of contracts: Theories and applications İçinde. London: Cambridge University Press.
31. MARTIN, J. (1978). X-inefficiency, managerial effort and protection. Economica, 45, 273- 286. ss.
32. NEWBERY, D. (2002). Privatisation, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities. London: The MIT Press.
33. NEWBERY, D., STIGLITZ, J. (1987). Wage rigidity, implicit contracts, unemployment and economic efficiency. The Economic Journal, 97 (386), 416-430. ss.
34. PEEL, D. A. (1974). A note on x-inefficiency. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88 (4), 687-688. ss.
35. PYNDICK, R., RUBINFELD, D. (2001). Microeconomics. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
36. RICKETTS, M. (2002); The economics of business enterprise: An introduction to economic organisation and the theory of the firm. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
37. ROZEN, M. (1985). Maximizing behavior: Reconciling neoclassical and x-efficiency approaches. Journal of Economic Issues, 19 (3), 661-689. ss.
38. SHEN, T. (1985). Worker motivation and x-efficiency. Kyklos, 38 (3), 392-411. ss.
39. STENNEK, J. (2000). Competition increases x-efficiency: A limited liability mechanism. European Economic Review, 44 (9), 1727-1744. ss.
40. STIGLER, G. (1976). The existence of x-efficiency. The American Economic Review, 66 (1), 213-216. ss.
41. STIGLITZ (1985). Information and economic analysis: A perspective. The Economic Journal, 95 (380), 21-41. ss.
42. TIROLE, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization, London: The MIT Press.
43. TULLOCK, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5 (3), 224-232. ss.
44. VISCUSI, K., VERNON, J., HARRINGTON, J. (2000). Economics of regulation and antitrust, 3. bs., London: The MIT Press.
45. WILLIAMSON, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications. New York: The Free Press.
46. WILLIAMSON, O. (1979). Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), 3-61. ss.
47. WILLIAMSON, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
48. WILLIAMSON, O. (2005). Transaction cost economics. C. MENARD, M. SHIRLEY (ed.), Handbook of new institutional economics içinde, Netherlands: Springer.