BANKA KREDİLERİNDE TERS SEÇİM VE AHLAKİ TEHLİKE ETKİSİ

Abstract

Stiglitz-Weiss modelinde, kredi piyasalarında ters seçim ve ahlaki tehlike problemlerinin derecesini etkileyen en önemli faktör olarak faiz oranı gösterilmektedir. Daha yüksek faiz oranının, daha riskli kredi müşterilerinin sayısını artırarak, kredilerin geri ödenme ihtimalini azaltacağı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu makalede, kredi faiz oranlarının geri ödenmeyen krediler oranına etkisi incelenmektedir. 2003:01-2013:02 dönemi kredi faiz oranları ile geri ödenmeyen krediler arasında Granger nedensellik testi uygulanmış, her iki değişken arasında iki yönlü nedensellik ilişkisi tespit edilmiştir.

Keywords

• Banka Kredileri, Ters Seçim, Ahlaki Tehlike, Nedensellik

THE EFFECT OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD ON BANK LENDING

Abstract

The Stiglitz-Weiss model suggests that interest rate is the most important factor affecting the degree of adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets. A higher interest rate increases the number of more risky customers and decreases the possibility of repayment of loans. This paper studies the effect of credit interest rate on the ratio of non-performing credit. Using data for the period 2003:01-2013:02, a causality test was applied to credit interest rate and nonperforming credit. The findings indicate that a bilateral causal relationship exists between the variables

Keywords

• Bank Lending, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Causality

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