YOLSUZLUK VE VERGİ KAÇAKÇILIĞI

Year 2006, Volume: 7 Issue: 2, 141 - 149, 01.07.2006

Sacit Hadi Akdede

Abstract

Yolsuzluk ve vergi kaçakçılığı sorunları literatürde daha önce ayrı ayrı incelendi. Vergi kaçakçılığı da bir yolsuzluk olsa da, bu makalede yolsuzluk devlet memurunun rüşvet alması ve vergi kaçakçılığı da mükellefin yasalara aykırı davranarak ödemesi gereken vergiyi ödememesi olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu makalede yolsuzluğun vergi kaçakçılığını özendirip özendirmeyeceği teorik olarak araştırılmaktadır. Teorik model, istenen rüşvetin yüksek olması durumunda vergi mükellefinin vergi kaçırmayacağını matematiksel olarak göstermektedir

Keywords

Yolsuzluk, Vergi Kaçakçılığı

CORRUPTION AND TAX EVASION

Abstract

Corruption and tax evasion problems have been investigated separately before. Tax evasion is also considered to be a corrupt behavior itself. However, in this paper, corruption is taken to be a bribe taken by a government official and tax evasion is defined as an illegal act to avoid paying taxes by violating tax laws. An interesting research question would be to see whether corruption can induce tax evasion in individuals ? It is found in the paper that the size of bribe can negatively affect tax evasion. It is shown that when a bribe is sufficiently large, taxpayers prefer to pay their taxes voluntarily, not to evade taxes.

Keywords

Corruption, Tax Evasion

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