Research Article

Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach

Volume: 18 Number: 2 April 1, 2018
EN

Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach

Abstract

This article investigates corporate tax payoffs in a repeated game theory approach. An application of mixed strategy infinitely repeated game for corporate tax payoffs is provided with four payment types included under new draft tax procedural law. The Folk Theorem is used to find SPNE of infinitely repeated game strategies. The results demonstrate that: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linear and that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2) Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both are not appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixed strategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates in order to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTP will prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possible request settlement when get caught for evading tax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectors and audit rates must be increased to break the courage of CTP evading tax.

Keywords

References

  1. Abreu, D. And Rubinstein, A. (1988) “The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata” Econometrica, 56(6): 1259-1281.
  2. Arrow, K. J. and Honkapohja, S. (1985). ""What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?" Frontiers of Economics, Oxford.
  3. Fukofuka, P. (2013) “The Contextual Framework of Corporate Income Tax Evasion” Journal of Accounting And Taxation, 5(2): 27-37.
  4. Hart, S. (2006) “Robert Aumann’s Game and Economic Theory” Scand. J. of Economics, 108(2): 185–211, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00448.x.
  5. Hinriches, H.H. (1969) “Game Theory and the Rational Tax Evader” Journal of Financial Research Center Conferences, 19: 123-132.
  6. Kalai, E., Samet, D. and Stanford, W. (1988) “A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games” International Journal of Game Theory, 17(3): 177-186.
  7. Luce, R. D. and Raiffa H. (1957) “Games and Decisions Introduction and Critical Survey”, Reprinted edition, New York.
  8. Matsushima, H. (2014) “Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy” Japanese Economic Review, 65: 116–121. doi:10.1111/jere.12014.

Details

Primary Language

English

Subjects

Economics

Journal Section

Research Article

Publication Date

April 1, 2018

Submission Date

October 24, 2016

Acceptance Date

-

Published in Issue

Year 2018 Volume: 18 Number: 2

APA
Kıral, E., & Mavruk, C. (2018). Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. Ege Academic Review, 18(2), 195-215. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2018237350
AMA
1.Kıral E, Mavruk C. Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. ear. 2018;18(2):195-215. doi:10.21121/eab.2018237350
Chicago
Kıral, Ersin, and Can Mavruk. 2018. “Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach”. Ege Academic Review 18 (2): 195-215. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2018237350.
EndNote
Kıral E, Mavruk C (April 1, 2018) Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. Ege Academic Review 18 2 195–215.
IEEE
[1]E. Kıral and C. Mavruk, “Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach”, ear, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 195–215, Apr. 2018, doi: 10.21121/eab.2018237350.
ISNAD
Kıral, Ersin - Mavruk, Can. “Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach”. Ege Academic Review 18/2 (April 1, 2018): 195-215. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2018237350.
JAMA
1.Kıral E, Mavruk C. Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. ear. 2018;18:195–215.
MLA
Kıral, Ersin, and Can Mavruk. “Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach”. Ege Academic Review, vol. 18, no. 2, Apr. 2018, pp. 195-1, doi:10.21121/eab.2018237350.
Vancouver
1.Ersin Kıral, Can Mavruk. Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach. ear. 2018 Apr. 1;18(2):195-21. doi:10.21121/eab.2018237350

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